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INTRODUCTION
The world is becoming a smaller place. Technology and the Internet
have made global travel and communication easier, quicker, and more
common. Novel legal issues arise every day to deal with this modern
interconnected world. How does the law address these new problems?
Congress is allowed “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”1 The scope
of Congress’s power to regulate commerce “among the several States”
(the “Interstate Commerce Clause”) has long been debated.2 In the
modern world of global interaction, Congress’s power to regulate
commerce “with foreign Nations” (the “Foreign Commerce Clause”)
may soon take center-stage.3 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not
yet articulated a legal framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause.
This lack of guidance has lead to circuit splits and confusion as to the
scope of this power.4
This legal issue has recently surfaced in the context of the
PROTECT Act, a statute with extraterritorial application that prohibits
U.S. citizens from molesting children abroad.5 Does the Foreign
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. Id.; see also infra Section II.A (discussing the legal framework of the Interstate
Commerce Clause).
3. U.S. CONST. ART I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. See infra Section II.B (discussing the current legal landscape of the Foreign
Commerce Clause).
5. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/3

2

Goodno: When the Commerce Clause Goes International: A Proposed Legal Fra

2013]

WHEN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE GOES INTERNATIONAL

1141

Commerce Clause give Congress plenary power to make it a crime for a
U.S. citizen to engage in child sex tourism in Cambodia? How about
robbing a bank in Spain? What about for far less offensive conduct,
such as littering in France? Indeed, can this be taken to the extreme so
that under the foreign commerce power Congress can prohibit a U.S.
citizen from eating pasta in Italy? How about conduct by non-U.S
citizens or other countries? Can Congress make it a crime for a nonU.S. citizen to engage in child sex tourism in Cambodia? Can Congress
require Mexico to enact an embargo of Cuban cigars? Set forth in the
chart below are four categories of hypotheticals which challenge the
scope of Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause:
Conduct by a Nation
U.S.
Actor

(1) Statutes regulating
conduct in the United
States
Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can
Congress enact an embargo
of Cuban cigars?

NonU.S.
Actor

(2) Extraterritorial
statutes regulating
conduct of foreign nations
Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can
Congress pass a law
requiring Mexico to enact
an embargo of Cuban
cigars?

Conduct by an Individual
in a Foreign Nation
(3) Extraterritorial statutes
regulating conduct of U.S.
citizens in foreign nations
Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can
Congress enact a law that
subjects a U.S. citizen to
criminal prosecution if they
molest children in Cambodia?
•Or if they rob a bank in
Spain?
•Or if they litter in
France?
(4) Extraterritorial statutes
regulating conduct of nonU.S. citizens in foreign
nations
Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can
Congress pass a law
prohibiting a Cambodian
citizen from molesting a child
in Cambodia?

All of these hypotheticals raise one important question: What
connection, if any, must the conduct have to the United States in order
Act (“the PROTECT Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006).
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for it to fall within the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause? Lower
courts are in disarray in how to answer this question.6 The purpose of
this Article is to set forth a practical and comprehensive legal
framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause that could be applied to
these different situations and to the myriad of other current federal laws
with extraterritorial application.7 This is the first Article to contemplate
a distinct legal framework in light of international legal principles and
in light of the history, jurisprudence, and text of the Foreign Commerce
Clause.8
The first part of this Article considers whether, under international
law, Congress can pass laws with extraterritorial reach. The answer is
clear—under the nationality jurisdictional principle, international norms
allow Congress to regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens in other
countries. This answer, however, is just the start to the analysis. The rest
of the Article considers what limits, if any, Congress has under the
Foreign Commerce Clause in enacting such laws.
The second part of this Article analyzes three possible ways to
interpret the Foreign Commerce Clause. First, the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Clauses share the same text in the Constitution.9 It could,
therefore, be argued that both Clauses should be interpreted the same
and that the same legal framework should apply. The federalism and
state sovereignty issues raised by the complex Interstate Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, however, do not arise in the context of the
Foreign Commerce Clause. Thus, there is no reason to simply
superimpose the legal framework of the Interstate Commerce Clause
onto the Foreign Commerce Clause without thought. Yet, as discussed
in the second section, this is precisely what a majority of lower courts
have done. In doing so, these courts have ignored the distinct history
and underlying concerns embedded in the Foreign Commerce Clause. A
few lower courts have recognized a distinction, but have adopted a
“tenable nexus” test10 that might give Congress unfettered power to
regulate conduct abroad without any apparent limits. As noted in the
third section, while many lower courts have adopted the legal
framework of the Interstate Commerce Clause, no court has
superimposed the legal framework of the Indian Commerce Clause onto
the Foreign Commerce Clause. Courts have not done so because they
6. See infra Section II.B (discussing the circuit splits and confusion on the legal
framework of the Foreign Commerce Clause).
7. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (listing hundreds of federal laws with potential
extraterritorial application).
8. See infra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text (distinguishing other articles which
have considered Foreign Commerce Clause issues).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. See infra Section II.B (discussing the “tenable nexus” test).
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recognize the distinct relationship the federal government has with
Indian tribes. Since the legal frameworks for the Interstate and Indian
Commerce Clauses reflect the distinct and unique relationships between
the relevant entities, then, by analogy, a legal framework for the Foreign
Commerce Clause should reflect the distinct relationship the federal
government has with foreign nations.
The third part of this Article considers the parameters of this distinct
relationship between the United States and foreign nations. As a matter
of first principles, any proposed legal framework should constrain
Congress’s foreign commerce power, while recognizing that the power
has been historically very broad (even broader than Congress’s
interstate commerce power) so that the United States can speak with one
voice in foreign matters. These constraints might best be determined by
the text of the Foreign Commerce Clause, which limits Congress’s
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”11 Prominent
scholars have debated the meaning of “[t]o regulate Commerce.”12
Instead of joining this debate, this Article simply takes the position that
whatever this phrase means, it may impose some limits on Congress’s
foreign commerce power. The foreign commerce power is further
limited by the phrase “with foreign Nations” (notably distinct from the
phrase “among the several States”).13 The term “with” is crucial. As
suggested by cases where courts have, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, determined the scope of federal jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct, there has to be some “connection” between the
United States and the foreign country.
The next section contemplates what factors this “connection” entails.
These factors consider that the conduct have both some impact on the
United States and some territorial nexus to the United States. These
factors also consider Congress’s intent to use its foreign commerce
power under the presumption that any regulation with extraterritorial
reach should respect international norms such as the sovereignty of
foreign nations. The last section of the Article applies this distinct legal
framework to the hypothetical laws set forth in the above chart in a way
that is meant to be practical and reflective of the history and text of the
Foreign Commerce Clause.

11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. Id.; see also infra Subsection III.C.1 (discussing the scholarly debate on the meaning
of “[t]o regulate Commerce”).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added); see also infra Subsection III.C.2
(analyzing the meaning of “with foreign Nations”).
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I. FEDERAL LAWS THAT GOVERN U.S. CITIZENS’ CONDUCT ABROAD
There are potentially hundreds of federal laws that give Congress the
power to regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens abroad, both in the civil
and criminal context.14 Some of those laws explicitly provide for
extraterritorial application, while others define “commerce” so broadly
that it implicitly encompasses foreign commerce. Set forth in Appendix
A of this Article is a chart listing federal laws with extraterritorial
application. For example, under Title 15, which concerns trademarks,
commerce is defined to include “all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress.”15 “[A]ll commerce” is such a broad definition
that it necessarily encompasses foreign commerce. On the criminal
front, there are over 300 federal statutes that have potential
extraterritorial application.16 Such crimes include: (1) homicide,
kidnapping, assault, sex crimes, and terrorism; (2) property destruction;
and (3) threats, false statements, theft, and counterfeiting.17 Some of
these criminal laws, like the statute criminalizing genocide,18 implicate
conduct covered by treaty obligations. But others—like the PROTECT
Act, which makes it illegal for U.S. citizens to molest children abroad—
expressly rely on Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power. 19
Laws with extraterritorial application raise two issues. First, under
international laws, are nations allowed to enact laws that regulate the
conduct of their citizens in other countries? The short answer is “yes” nations are allowed to enact reasonable laws with extraterritorial
application.20 This conclusion, however, is only the start of the analysis.
The second issue, and the focus of this Article, is whether the
Constitution, and in particular the Foreign Commerce Clause, gives
Congress the power to enact such laws. The next two sections consider
each of these issues.

14. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (listing federal laws with possible extraterritorial reach).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., infra Appendix A; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL Law 40–63 (2012), [hereinafter
CRS Report], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-166.pdf (listing a number of
federal criminal laws subject to extraterritorial application).
17. See, e.g., infra Appendix A.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006) (making it a crime for a U.S. national to commit genocide
abroad in accordance with the U.S. ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. EXEC. DOC. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S.
277).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)–(c) (2006) (making it a crime for a U.S. citizen who “travels in
foreign commerce” to molest a child).
20. See infra Section I.A.
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A. Permissible Under International Law
At the outset, it is important to note that international law is only
persuasive authority.21 Therefore, unless Congress has expressly
codified the law, United States courts are not bound by international
law. Nevertheless, courts presume that Congress intends to enact
statutes within the bounds of international law.22
International law provides several jurisdictional principles under
which a nation may extraterritorially apply a statute. The common
classification of jurisdiction relies on five principles: (1) the territorial
principle which allows for jurisdiction over conduct either within or
having “detrimental effects” in the United States; (2) the active
nationality principle which allows for jurisdiction based on the
nationality of the offender; (3) the passive personality principle which
allows for jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim; (4) the
protective principle which allows for jurisdiction over “foreigners for []
act[s] committed outside the United States that may impinge on the
territorial integrity, security, or political independence of the United
States”; and (5) the universality principle which provides jurisdiction
over extraterritorial acts for crimes so heinous as to be universally
condemned.23
21. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–06 (2008) (finding that International
Court of Justice laws did not create domestically enforceable law); United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n fashioning the reach of our criminal law [to apply to overseas
conduct], ‘Congress is not bound by international law.’ ‘If it chooses to do so, it may legislate
with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by international
law.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Our
duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform the
law of the land to norms of customary international law.”); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d
245, 248 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (“International law principles, standing on their own, do not create
substantive rights or affirmative defenses for litigants in United States courts.” (citing United
States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 1990))); RONALD C. SLYE, BETH VAN
SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 104 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2009) (“[T]he
resolutions, declarations, statements, and records of multilateral bodies—such as the UN
General Assembly, the International Law Commission, and the Committee Against
Torture . . . are recommendatory.”).
22. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(explaining that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains”); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86 (“In determining whether
Congress intended a federal statute to apply to overseas conduct, ‘an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.’”)
(citations omitted); Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1069 (“Although Congress is not bound by
international law in enacting statutes, out of respect for other nations, courts should not
unnecessarily construe a congressional statute in a way that violates international law.”)
(citations omitted).
23. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. a
(1987) [hereinafter Restatement]). Harvard Research in International Law first articulated these
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Of these jurisdictional principles, the second principle, active
nationality, explicitly allows nations to regulate the conduct of their
citizens within other nations. While some of these jurisdictional
principles are controversial,24 the active nationality principle is almost
“universally accepted.”25 U.S. courts have applied this principle to laws
with extraterritorial application “based upon the allegiance” that U.S.
citizens “owe” to the “country and its laws.”26
Importantly, the exercise of jurisdiction under any of these principles
has to be reasonable.27 There are a number of factors that courts
consider when determining reasonableness, including “the link of the
activity” and “the connections, such as nationality, residence, or
economic activity.”28 Many U.S. courts have found the active
nationality principle as a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction to uphold
federal laws with extraterritorial reach.29 Thus, under international law
five principles in a study.. Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 445
(Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Study]. “These principles are not mutually exclusive but may
in fact overlap.” United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 258 n.3 (1st Cir. 1982) (citation omitted);
see also CRS Report, supra note 16, at 12–14 (noting that many courts rely on more than one
jurisdictional principle to justify the extraterritorial application of federal laws).
24. Passive nationality principle (where the focus is on the nationality of the victim) and
the universal principle are controversial. See Harvard Study, supra note 23, at 445 (explaining
that the passive nationality principle is “contested” by some nations and the universal principle
is “widely though by no means universally accepted”); see also Eugene Kontorovich, The
Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183,
184 (2004) (“Universal jurisdiction can have dangerous consequences.”).
25. Harvard Study, supra note 23, at 445.
26. United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying the active
nationality principle to uphold criminal convictions based on conduct abroad); see also
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (explaining that a U.S. citizen who lived
abroad “continued to owe allegiance to the United States” and that “[b]y virtue of the
obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him”).
27. Restatement, supra note 23, § 403 cmt. a (explaining that “[t]he principle that an
exercise of jurisdiction on one of the bases indicated . . . is nonetheless unlawful if it is
unreasonable [a]s established in United States law, and has emerged as a principle of
international law”). One commentator explained how courts apply the Restatement’s
reasonableness requirement: “While the Restatement’s views carry considerable weight with
both Congress and the courts, the courts have traditionally ascertained the extent to which
international law would recognize extraterritorial application of a particular law by citing the
Harvard study principles, read expansively.” CRS Report, supra note 16, at 12 (citation
omitted).
28. Restatement, supra note 23, § 403(2).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding the
extraterritorial reach of the PROTECT Act as a reasonable exercise of active nationality
jurisdiction); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States
v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 797 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (same); see also Blackmer, 284 U.S. at
437 (upholding the conviction of a U.S. citizen living in Paris who ignored a subpoena
explaining that “[w]ith respect to such an exercise of [extraterritorial jurisdiction], there is no
question of international law”); United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 2002)
(upholding criminal convictions of U.S. citizens who committed crimes in Mexico because the
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there is little dispute that Congress can enact laws that regulate the
conduct of U.S. citizens in other countries.30
B. Permissible Under the Foreign Commerce Clause?
Given that international law allows for the United States to regulate
the conduct of its citizens abroad, are there any limits? On the domestic
front, courts have consistently held, on statutory-interpretation grounds,
that Congress can enact laws that regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens
abroad.31 There are various constitutional provisions that might be
relied upon to give Congress the power to enact laws with
extraterritorial reach. For example, the Constitution gives Congress the
power “[t]o define and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of the Nations;”32 and “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to carry out the “foregoing
Powers” (the “Necessary and Proper Clause”).33 Relying on these last
two powers, courts have upheld the constitutionality of federal criminal
laws with extraterritorial reach in the maritime context.34 Courts have
also relied on Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper clause
along with other powers, such as the President’s Foreign Affairs Power
and Treaty-Making Power,35 to uphold laws in the foreign affairs
context.36
active nationality principle “permits a country to apply its statutes to extraterritorial acts of its
own nationals”); United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
federal court system had jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen for a crime committed in Canada).
30. There are number of other countries that have enacted laws with extraterritorial
application. For example, Germany, Japan, and Australia have all enacted laws, similar to the
PROTECT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423, making it a crime for their citizens to engage in child sex
tourism abroad. Crimes (Child Sex Tourism) Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) (Austl.);
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL.
I], as amended §§ 174–84 (Ger.); KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [Pen. C.] 1907, art. 3, 174–84.
31. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813–14 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting on other grounds, Scalia explained “this Court has repeatedly upheld its
power to make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries where
United States interests are affected” (citing Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 621–23 (1927);
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98–99 (1922); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347, 356 (1909))).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Congress has primarily relied on this power to enact
criminal legislation in the “maritime context.” CRS Report, supra note 16, at 1.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (11th Cir.
2011) (noting that Congress has the power under clause 10 of the U.S. Constitution to enact the
Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2285 (2010)).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army . . . . He shall have Power . . . to make Treaties . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936)
(upholding as constitutional Congress’s delegation to the President of the authority to prohibit
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The Constitution also allows Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations,”37 which is the power explicitly relied upon for the
enactment of the PROTECT Act.38 Congressional power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause is crucial because it potentially fills a gap
where the other powers do not reach. For example, Congress can only
enact laws dealing with treaties, if such treaties exist.39 Congress can
only enact laws dealing with the “Law of Nations” if there is such an
offense under international law.40 Thus, because many federal laws with
extraterritorial application implicate neither a treaty nor the “Law of the
Nations,”41 the Foreign Commerce Clause takes center stage.
Indeed, with rapid globalization and the increased application of
U.S. laws with extraterritorial reach, courts are currently wrestling with
Congress’s foreign commerce power.42 Unlike the Interstate Commerce
Clause, which the U.S. Supreme Court and scores of lawyers and
scholars have analyzed,43 the Foreign Commerce Clause has only
recently and aggressively garnered the attention of lower courts44 and
Congress.45 Scholars have only just started addressing this issue.46 The
the sale of weapons to certain countries engaged in hostilities with each other under the foreign
affairs power); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 805 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Congressional
power to pass those laws that are necessary and proper to effectuate the enumerated powers of
the Constitution is nowhere broader and more important than in the realm of foreign
relations. . . . It follows generally that ‘ [i]f [a] treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of [a] statue [passed] under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to
execute the powers of the Government.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), (c) (2006) (explaining that the law covers “travels in foreign
commerce”).
39. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 952
(2010).
40. See id.; Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumerated
Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1219–23 (2009).
41. See, e.g., infra Appendix A.
42. See infra Section II.B (discussing the current legal landscape of the Foreign
Commerce Clause).
43. See, e.g., infra Section II.A (describing cases and scholarship dealing with the
Interstate Commerce Clause).
44. See infra Section II.B (analyzing court cases dealing with the Foreign Commerce
Clause).
45. For example, in February 2012 a report was made for Congress specifically
concerning the extraterritorial reach of American criminal law. CRS Report, supra note 16.
46. The vast majority of scholarship written about the Foreign Commerce Clause focuses
solely on the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act rather than on articulating a legal
framework for how to analyze Foreign Commerce Clause issues. See generally Daniel Bolia,
Comment, Policing Americans Abroad: The PROTECT Act, the Case Against Michael Lewis
Clark, and the Use of the Foreign Commerce Clause in an Increasingly Flat World, 48 S. TEX.
L. REV. 797 (2007) (arguing that Supreme Court precedent indicates that the PROTECT Act
falls within the powers delegated to Congress through the Foreign Commerce Clause); Julie
Buffington, Comment, Taking the Ball and Running with It: U.S. v. Clark and Congress’s
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U.S. Supreme Court has not yet articulated the extent of Congress’s
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact laws with
extraterritorial reach. Because of this lack of guidance, as discussed in
the next section, lower courts are at a loss for how to analyze Foreign
Commerce Clause issues. This confusion has resulted in circuit splits
and even conflicts within the same circuits.47 Lower courts, in fact, have
shied away from addressing Foreign Commerce Clause issues. For
example, one court specifically avoided ruling on the scope of
Congress’s foreign commerce power by reframing the issue as one of
statutory interpretation.48
Unlimited Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 841 (2006)
(asserting that judicial precedent provides little guidance to future courts concerned with
determining whether statutes that regulate the activities of U.S. citizens traveling abroad pass
constitutional muster, and that courts should turn to the principles established in United States v.
Lopez when confronted with this issue); Jeff Christensen, Comment, Congressional Power to
Regulate Noncommercial Activity Overseas: Interstate Commerce Clause Precedent Indicates
Constitutional Limitations on Foreign Commerce Clause Authority, 81 WASH. L. REV. 621
(2006) (arguing that Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause Authority does not extend to
noncommercial sexual abuse of minors overseas by U.S. citizens); Nicholas Christophilis, Case
Comment, Constitutional Law—Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003—Congress Did Not Exceed Its Constitutional
Authority By Criminalizing Commercial Sex Abroad, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV 515
(2007) (discussing United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), and its ruling that the
PROTECT Act is constitutional because Congress traditionally has broad authority to regulate
foreign commerce); Joana Doerfel, Comment, Regulating Unsettled Issues in Latin America
Under the Treaty Powers of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
331, 342 (2008); James Asa High, Jr., The Basis for Jurisdiction over U.S. Sex Tourists: An
Examination of the Case Against Michael Lewis Clark, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 343,
365 (2005); Christine L. Hogan, Note, Touring Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: The
Constitutionality of Prosecuting Non-Commercial Sexually Illicit Acts Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(c), 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 641 (2007); Amy Messigian, Note, Love’s Labour’s Lost:
Michael Lewis Clark’s Constitutional Challenge of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1241 (2006); Ninth Circuit Holds That Congress Can Regulate Sex Crimes Committed by U.S.
Citizens Abroad—United States v. Clark, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2612 (2006). A few other scholars
have discussed the Foreign Commerce Clause legal framework, but primarily as applied on the
domestic front instead of as applied to laws with extraterritorial reach. See, e.g., Kenneth M.
Casebeer, The Power to Regulate “Commerce with Foreign Nations” in a Global Economy and
the Future of American Democracy: An Essay, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 25, 43 (2001); Saikrishna
Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55
ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1165–72 (2003). Only one scholar has expressly analyzed the legal
framework of the Foreign Commerce Clause as it applies to laws with exterritorial reach, but the
legal framework adopted is a version of the Interstate Commerce Clause, which, as discussed in
the next section of this article, fails to take into account reasons why such a framework may not
work. See Colangelo, supra note 39, at 985–1041.
47. See infra Subsection II.B.2.b.
48. United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We note, finally,
that our determination that § 2423(b) [of the PROTECT Act] does not extend to travel occurring
wholly between foreign nations and without any territorial nexus to the United States [is a
matter of statutory interpretation and] appropriately avoids the necessity of addressing whether
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This Article, therefore, attempts to set forth a comprehensive and
practical legal framework that courts and Congress might consider when
confronted with Foreign Commerce Clause matters, particularly federal
laws that regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens abroad. Should courts
simply recast the legal framework of the Interstate or Indian Commerce
Clauses onto the Foreign Commerce Clause? As analyzed in the
remainder of this Article, given the historical, textual, and theoretical
differences underlying the Foreign Commerce Clause, it is apparent that
courts should apply a new and distinct legal framework when
considering the extent of Congress’s foreign commerce power. This is
the first Article to advocate for and present a new and distinct legal
framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause.49
II. THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: EXISTING
OPTIONS INADEQUATE
The Commerce Clause identifies three specific groups “among” or
“with” which Congress can regulate commerce: “among the several
States;” “with foreign Nations,” and “with the Indian Tribes.”50 As
discussed in depth in this section, these three distinct groups have given
rise to three commerce clauses, each of which has its own distinct line
of cases: (1) the Interstate Commerce Clause; (2) the Foreign
Commerce Clause; and (3) the Indian Commerce Clause.51 There are
numerous scholarly debates on what the tests should be for the Interstate
such an exercise of congressional power would comport with the Constitution.”) (emphasis
added).
49. Colangelo is the only scholar to have expressly written on the legal structure of the
Foreign Commerce Clause as it applies to the United States’ relationship with foreign countries.
Colangelo, supra note 39. This Article, however, is distinguishable from Colangelo’s approach
in two ways. First, Colangelo argues that, because of national sovereignty concerns, the Foreign
Commerce Clause power does not give Congress the right to make laws inside other nations.
See id. at 954–55. I agree; however, this point misses an interesting issue. To what extent does
the Foreign Commerce Clause allow Congress to regulate U.S. citizens’ conduct inside such
nations? See infra Part III (discussing this issue). Colangelo does not squarely address this issue.
This leads to the second difference between our articles. In setting forth the legal framework for
the Foreign Commerce Clause, Colangelo “recast[s] the Supreme Court’s three-category
[Interstate] Commerce Clause framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Colangelo, supra
note 39, at 955 (citation omitted). I disagree with superimposing such a framework. Instead, I
argue that a new and distinct legal framework is necessary. See infra Parts II and III (discussing
why the Interstate Commerce Clause framework does not work and why a new framework is
necessary).
50. Congress is allowed “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
51. There are scholarly debates about whether there should even be three commerce
clauses. Compare Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of
the Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149 (2003), with Adrian Vermeule, Three
Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175 (2003).
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and Indian Commerce Clauses.52 The purpose of this Article is not to
advocate for or critique such debates. 53 Rather, the limited purpose of
this Article is to scrutinize whether the current legal framework (good
or bad) of either the Interstate or Indian Commerce Clause should be
applied to the Foreign Commerce Clause.54
The majority of the lower courts have applied the legal framework of
the Interstate Commerce Clause to Foreign Commerce Clause issues
without explaining why.55 To determine whether this application is the
right method, it is essential to first understand the Founders’ and the
Supreme Court’s understandings of the Interstate Commerce Clause.56
A review of the Interstate Commerce Clause will show that, although
convoluted, the underlying concern of its legal framework is to preserve
state sovereignty. Such a concern is completely absent when dealing
with the Foreign Commerce Clause.57 Thus, as first addressed below,
simply superimposing the legal framework of the Interstate Commerce
Clause is not a good option.
Yet, as discussed in the second part of this section, that is exactly
what a majority of courts have done. Without much thought, a majority
of lower courts have applied the legal framework of the Interstate
Commerce Clause onto the Foreign Commerce Clause when federal
laws with extraterritorial reach are challenged.58 There are, however, a
few courts which have adopted a new “tenable nexus” test resulting in a

52. See infra Sections II.A and II.C. There is even a lively scholarly debate on how to
define “commerce,” which is further discussed in Section III.C. Compare Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Obamacare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Identifying Historical Limits
on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703 (2012) [hereinafter Pushaw, Obamacare],
with AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 107–08 (2005), and Jack Balkin,
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010).
53. For a good analysis of the scholarly debate of how the Commerce Clause should be
interpreted, see, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A
Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185 (2003).
54. For more in depth summaries of the history of the Commerce Clause, see, e.g., AMAR,
supra note 52, at 107–08; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 3.3 (4th ed., Aspen 2011); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4 (8th ed. 2010); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 807–32 (3rd ed. 2000); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve
State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9–42 (1999) [hereinafter Nelson &
Pushaw, First Principles].
55. See infra Section II.B.
56. See infra Section II.A; see also NOWAK, supra note 54, § 4.1 at 158 (“The history of
the commerce clause adjudication is, in a very real sense, the history of federalism. It therefore
is necessary to look at the treatment that the Supreme Court has given this clause throughout
each stage in its history, before summarizing the Court’s current position.”).
57. See infra Section II.A.
58. See infra Section II.B.
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circuit split.59 While this Article agrees with these courts that a distinct
legal framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause is necessary, as
discussed below, this new “tenable nexus” test is so ill-defined that it is
seemingly limitless. Courts need a more thorough legal framework
when considering the extent of Congress’s foreign commerce power.
Finally, the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce
Clause share the same “with” language in the Constitution,60 so
arguably there might be reason to think that the tests should be similar
to each other. However, as examined in the third part of this Section, the
Indian Commerce Clause has a distinct legal framework based on the
unique historical relationship the federal government has with Indian
Tribes. 61 As such, it does not make sense to simply recast the broad
power Congress has under the Indian Commerce Clause onto the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
In sum, this section addresses three possible options courts could
adopt when analyzing Congress’s foreign commerce power. None of
these options work. Therefore, this section concludes that the Foreign
Commerce Clause needs its own distinct and comprehensive legal
framework that reflects relevant history, precedent, and text.
A. Option #1: The Interstate Commerce Clause Legal Framework—
Too Distinctive and Complex
The Interstate Commerce Clause, particularly in comparison to the
Foreign Commerce Clause, has been widely litigated and numerous
scholars have written about it.62 It has recently received even more
attention63 given that Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause was one of the main issues that deeply divided the Court in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,64 the
Obamacare case. Since many lower courts are superimposing the legal
59. See id.
60. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
61. See infra Section II.C.
62. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 52, at 107–87; Nelson & Pushaw, First Principles, supra
note 54, at 9–42.
63. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Upholds Health Care Law, 5-4, in Victory for
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/supreme-court-letshealth-law-largely-stand.html?page wanted=all; Matt Negrin & Ariane de Vogue, Supreme
Court Health Care Ruling: The Mandate Can Stay, OTUS NEWS, June 28, 2012,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/supreme-court-announces-decision-obamas-health-carelaw/story?id=16663839&page=2#.UCF9Ixy1l0s.
64. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The Court was unable
to come to any consensus concerning the analysis of the Interstate Commerce Clause issue,
although a majority of Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) concluded that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power in enacting the individual mandate which
required purchase of health care insurance. Id. at 2593, 2644–50. See also infra notes 126–32
and accompanying text discussing Sebelius.
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framework of the Interstate Commerce Clause onto the Foreign
Commerce Clause,65 it is imperative first to understand Congress’s
interstate commerce power so that it can be assessed whether courts
should consider that same framework when analyzing the Congress’s
foreign commerce power. As this section concludes, the history and
current legal landscape of the Interstate Commerce Clause points to one
conclusion—this framework does not work for the Foreign Commerce
Clause because it is specifically tailored to address federalism and state
sovereignty concerns, which have no relevance to Congress’s
relationship with foreign nations.
1. History
Historically, the lack of the power conferred under the Interstate
Commerce Clause was one of the defects that induced the adoption of
the Constitution and the abandonment of the Articles of
Confederation.66 Prior to the colonial revolution, the power to regulate
American commerce rested entirely in the hands of the English crown.67
After the revolution, although the colonies distrusted centralized power,
they recognized the importance of maintaining a central government so
that they could organize a common defense against British and other
foreign attacks.68 Thus, the federal government’s powers under the
Articles of Confederation were limited to those necessary for national
defense, but the power over commerce, including foreign commerce,
was excluded. 69 Subsequently, states enacted personally favorable
65. See infra Section II.B.
66. As Justice Ginsburg recently explained: “The Commerce Clause, it is widely
acknowledged, ‘was the Framers’ response to the central problem that gave rise to the
Constitution itself.’” Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244–45, n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
67. See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 139 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1833) (“[A]ll subjects and their
children inhabiting [the colonies] shall be deemed natural-born subjects, and . . . the laws of
England . . . shall be in force there; and no laws shall be made which are repugnant to . . . the
laws of England.”); Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of
Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 855 (2002).
68. STORY, supra note 67, at 217–18
69. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. IX, para. 1 (granting to the federal
government powers similar to those assumed during the revolution, including the power to
determine peace or war, to send ambassadors to foreign nations, to form treaties and alliances,
and to enforce and regulate maritime law). Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal
government did not have power over commerce:
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive
right and power of . . . entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no
treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the
respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on
foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the
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commercial regulations that often directly conflicted with the
regulations in neighboring states.70 The federal government was unable
to prevent the states from implementing protectionist laws which
destroyed the national economy.71 The Interstate Commerce Clause was
“an addition which few oppose[d] and from which no apprehensions
[were] entertained.”72
Although most agreed there was a need for the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the Founders’ guiding principle was to limit federal government
power and protect state sovereignty. Madison explained: “The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite.”73 Thus, while the Constitution gave
Congress enumerated power in the Interstate Commerce Clause, it left
the power to regulate all non-commerce matters to the states.74 This
exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities
whatsoever . . . .
Id.
70. STORY, supra note 67, at 239–40.
71. As Chief Justice Marshall noted:
The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to the adoption of the
constitution can scarcely be forgotten. . . . Congress, indeed, possessed the
power of making treaties, but the inability of the federal government to enforce
them had become so apparent as to render that power in a great degree
useless. . . . It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the
feebleness of the federal government, contributed more to that great revolution
which introduced the present system, than the deep and general conviction, that
commerce ought to be regulated by Congress.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 445–46 (1827). The Court has further observed that:
“[t]he few simple words of the Commerce Clause . . . reflected a central
concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new
Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that
had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation.”
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979).
72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
73. Id. at 292.
74. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause
Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 886–87 (2005) [hereinafter Pushaw,
Counter-Revolution] (“Most importantly, an overarching Federalist theme was that the new
Constitution would meet the crying need for uniform national regulation of interstate commerce,
but would leave to the states their existing ‘police powers’ over internal, noncommercial matters
of public health, safety, morality, and social welfare. The Commerce Clause would thereby help
America develop a common market without interfering with each state’s ability to respond to its
unique culture, customs, and social mores.”) (footnotes omitted).
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federalism concern, defining the balance of power between the federal
government and states, has been the subject of a long line of Interstate
Commerce Clauses cases and is briefly discussed next.
2. Current Legal Landscape
According to the Court, the “interpretation of the [Interstate]
Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has developed.”75 For the
first century, Congress primarily used the power of the Interstate
Commerce Clause “as a limit on state legislation that discriminated
against interstate commerce.”76 Because the industrial revolution
ushered in “an increasingly interdependent national economy,”77 during
the late 1800s Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
and the Sherman Antitrust Act, both of which targeted monopolistic
practices.78 The Court found both of these federal laws constitutional
under the Interstate Commerce Clause because “the interstate and
intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled together that full
regulation of interstate commerce required incidental regulation of
intrastate commerce.”79
By 1942, the Court in Wickard v. Filburn extended the power of
Congress under the Interstate Commerce Clause to regulate a farmer’s
decision to grow wheat on his own farm for personal consumption
(intrastate activity).80 In Wickard, the Court explained that the decision
to consume only homegrown wheat allowed the farmer to avoid
purchasing wheat on the market, which would have a “substantial
effect” on the interstate wheat market when considered in the
aggregate.81 Wickard is regarded as “perhaps the most far reaching
example of [Interstate] Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity.”82 Indeed, up until the 1995 decision in United States v.
Lopez83 “the Supreme Court did not find one federal law
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce

75. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
76. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (citing Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568
573–75 (1853) (upholding state monopoly where activity involved regulation of internal
commerce); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17, 20–22 (1888) (upholding state law concerning the
manufacture of liquor as “purely internal domestic commerce of a State”).
77. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).
78. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (regulating the railroad industry and
later other common carriers); Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (currently codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).
79. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (citing The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914)).
80. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114–15, 128–29 (1942).
81. Id. at 127–29.
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
83. Id.
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power.” 84
In Lopez the Court articulated the current legal framework applied to
Interstate Commerce Clause issues.85 The Court in Lopez held that
Congress exceeded its power under the Interstate Commerce Clause by
enacting a criminal law that made it illegal for an individual to possess a
gun near a school.86 In coming to this conclusion, the Court first
reviewed the historical “watershed” cases87 dealing with Congress’s
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause and then “[c]onsistent
with this structure, [] identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power.”88 These three
categories include: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce;”
(2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce;” and (3) “activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.”89 It is important to note that each of these three
categories specifically refer to “interstate commerce;” there is no
mention of foreign commerce. Each of these three categories has
produced its own line of precedents; however, the third category
(substantial effects) has been litigated the most and is therefore the most
complex. This Article will briefly discuss the three-category framework
to show that the Court’s underlying concern was state sovereignty, a
nonissue for the Foreign Commerce Clause (and, thus why it does not
make sense to superimpose the legal framework of the Interstate
Commerce Clause onto the Foreign Commerce Clause).
Under the first category (channels), Congress may regulate the
conduits, such as highways, airspace, and navigable waterways of
interstate transportation. For example, Congress may criminalize the
movement across state lines of stolen goods or kidnapped persons,90 the
shipment of goods across state lines in violation of labor laws,91 the
transportation across state lines of women for prostitution,92 and the
mailing of lottery tickets.93 Under this category, Congress may also
84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, § 3.3.5, at 269.
85. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005); Pierce County, Wash. v.
Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2003); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2000)
(all applying the Lopez framework to Interstate Commerce Clause issues).
86. Lopez, 514 U.S at 567.
87. Id. at 555–56 (mentioning NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317. U.S. 111 (1942)).
88. Id. at 558.
89. Id. at 558–59 (emphasis added). The Court has noted that these categories “are not
precise formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be.” Id. at 567.
90. Perez v. United Sates, 402 U.S 146, 150 (1971).
91. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114–15 (1941).
92. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320–23 (1913) (upholding the constitutional
validity of the Mann Act (also referred to as the White Slave Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24, under
Congress’s interstate commerce power).
93. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 354–55 (1903).
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keep commerce free from “immoral and injurious uses”94 such as
prohibiting a motel from racial discrimination because the motel profits
come from interstate travelers.95
Under the second category (instrumentalities), Congress may
regulate the means of interstate travel such as “vehicles”96 or the
destruction, even intrastate, of aircraft.97 The Court has sometimes
relied on both the first and second categories to uphold a law. For
example, in the 2003 case of Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, the
Court upheld congressional regulation of state-made reports concerning
dangerous intrastate roadways under both the “channels” and
“instrumentalities” categories.98
Significantly, for both category one (channels) and category two
(instrumentalities) there is an undisputed jurisdictional “nexus to
interstate commerce”99 because both categories relate to movement
between states or the means by which such movement takes place.
Therefore, federal laws regulating channels or instrumentalities
primarily regulate conduct between states, not in the states. As Justice
94. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917).
95. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964) (finding Title
II of the Civil Rights Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause because racial
discrimination “imepede[d] interstate travel” through the channels of commerce); see also
Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (holding the Fair Labor Standards Act a proper exercise of Congress’s
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause because the “activities intrastate . . . so affect
interstate commerce”).
96. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20, 26–27 (1911)).
97. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
98. Pierce County, Washington. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147–48 (2003). In Guillen, the
Court examined the constitutionality of the Hazard Elimination Program, “which provide[d]
state and local governments with [federal] funding to improve the most dangerous sections of
their roads. To be eligible for funds under the Program, a state or local government must [have]
undertake[n] a thorough evaluation of its public roads.” Id. at 133. To encourage states to
participate, Congress subsequently modified the program and determined that reports made
pursuant to the program “shall not be admitted into evidence in Federal or State court.”Id. at
134. In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal program
under the Interstate Commerce Clause because
“[i]t is well established that the Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to
‘regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.’ In addition, under the
Commerce Clause, Congress ‘is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities.’”
Id. at 146–47 (citations omitted). The Court concluded: “Congress could reasonably believe that
adopting a measure eliminating an unforeseen side effect of the information-gathering
requirement . . . would result in more diligent efforts to collect the relevant information, more
candid discussions of hazardous locations, better informed decisionmaking, and, ultimately,
greater safety on our Nation’s roads.” Id. at 147.
99. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
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Scalia explained: “The first two categories are self-evident, since they
are the ingredients of interstate commerce itself.”100
For the third category, which allows Congress to regulate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce, the Court has devised an
elaborate legal framework that is “the most unsettled” and “most
frequently disputed.”101 Four key cases, each of which will be taken in
turn, help illustrate the complexity of the “substantial effects” category;
these cases include: United States v. Lopez,102 United States v.
Morrison,103 Gonzales v. Raich,104 and National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius.105 It is important to understand the
development of law in these four cases because a majority of lower
courts are superimposing the legal framework articulated in these cases
onto the Foreign Commerce Clause.106 Such superimposition is
problematic, because, as illustrated below, the Court does not rely on,
cite to, or even significantly mention the Foreign Commerce Clause in
any of these cases, yet lower courts are mistakenly proceeding as if the
Court did.
In Lopez, after articulating the three-category framework, the Court,
in a five-to-four decision, applied the “substantial effects” category to
strike down a statute making it a federal crime to possess a gun in a
school zone.107 The Court found that this criminal law, which was
aimed only at possession (as opposed to the buying, selling, or
transportation across state lines), had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or
any sort of economic enterprise.” 108 The Court rejected the
Government’s aggregation argument that gun possession led to violent
crimes that in turn affected the national economy.109 The Court refused
“to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States.”110 Thus, while
the Court’s main concern was to protect the sovereignty of the state’s
100. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
101. United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 622 (10th Cir. 2006).
102. 514 U.S. at 549.
103. 529 U.S. 598, 609–13 (2000).
104. 545 U.S. 1.
105. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
106. See infra Section II.B. (discussing how lower courts are applying the Interstate
Commerce Clause legal framework onto the Foreign Commerce Clause).
107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
108. Id. at 561.
109. Id. at 563–64. The Court explained that the federal criminal law could not “be
sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce.” Id. at 561.
110. Id. at 567.
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general police power, there is no such concern under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. In Lopez, the Court also had two other concerns
about the federal law: the statute failed to have any language to
establish a “jurisdictional element” to interstate commerce; and, while
the Court would not exclusively defer to congressional findings that the
law affected interstate commerce, the complete lack of it was
problematic.111
Five years later in Morrison, another five-to-four decision,112 the
Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act.113 Although in
Morrison there were specific congressional findings (which were
lacking in Lopez) that violence against women impacted the national
economy, the Court held that the law did not regulate activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce.114 The Court flatly rejected
the congressional regulation of “noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce.”115 The Court explicitly noted that its decision relied on the
principles of state sovereignty: “Indeed, we can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent
crime and vindication of its victims.”116 Lopez and Morrison
represented the first time in almost sixty years an instance in which the
Court held that a federal statute violated Congress’s Interstate
Commerce Clause. This caused some scholars to conclude that the
Court was attempting to reign in Congress’s power under the Interstate

111. Id. at 562–63 (explaining that “Congress normally is not required to make formal
findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce . . . . But to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce . . . they are lacking here.”)
(citations omitted).
112. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
113. The Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
114. In rejecting the congressional findings that interstate commerce was impacted, the
Court explained:
[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain
the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation . . . . “[[W]]hether
particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather
than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.”
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, n.2).
115. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. As one scholar concluded: “After Lopez, it is very difficult
for Congress to impose a federal criminal punishment in intra-state activity if [it] is not
commercial in character. The Court will not aggregate non-commercial, intra-state activity.”
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 54, § 4.10(c), at 201.
116. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (citations omitted).
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Commerce Clause.117 However, a few years later came Raich.118
In Raich, the Court upheld the Controlled Substance Act, which
criminalized the production and use of homegrown marijuana for
medicinal use even though the activities were allowed under state
law.119 The Court first determined under the Interstate Commerce
Clause that Congress had the power to enact a “‘general regulatory
statute’” dealing with the manufacture and possession of drugs,
including marijuana.120 Then, analogizing to Wickard and relying on the
Necessary and Proper Clause,121 the Court concluded: “[A]s in Wickard,
when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate
market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its
authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to
‘regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.’” 122 The Court
distinguished Lopez and Morrison by pointing out that the federal laws
at issue in those cases were not part of comprehensive regulatory
schemes.123
There has been much debate about whether Lopez and Morrison
were outliers, and whether their holdings were consistent with Raich.124
For the limited purposes of this Article, however, the significant
takeaway is that the three-category framework articulated in Lopez is
117. See, e.g., Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 74, at 882 (noting that “the Court
[in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005)] held that any commodity with an interstate market
(including marijuana) was ‘commercial’ or ‘economic’”); see also BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 217–
21 (Oxford University Press 1998) (supporting the proposition that the justices who decided
Wickard knew that almost any activity, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affected
interstate commerce).
118. Raich, 545 U.S. 1.
119. Id. at 5–9.
120. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause).
122. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
123. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23–26.
124. For example, one scholar wrote:
Was a revolution afoot [after the Lopez and Morrison decisions], which would
shake the foundations of New Deal and Great Society legislation that had long
ago received judicial blessing? Or would the Court confine its doctrinal
innovations to the invalidation of a few recent laws on “hot button” issues that
largely duplicated existing legislation, such as bans on guns near schools and
sexual assault? In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court appeared to choose the latter
path.
Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 74, at 882. Another scholar concluded that in Raich,
“[t]he Court did not change the test for the commerce clause that it has followed since Lopez in
1995 . . . . Instead, Gonzales v. Raich stands for the proposition that intrastate production of a
commodity sold in interstate commerce is economic activity and thus substantial effect can be
based on cumulative impact.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, § 3.3.5, at 277.
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the way the Court analyzes the Interstate Commerce Clause issues, even
if it is often “mechanically recited.”125 This was confirmed in Sebelius,
where a deeply fractured Court found the individual mandate to buy
health insurance unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause
(and Necessary and Proper Clause), but constitutional under the Taxing
Clause.126 For the commerce clause issue, Chief Justice Roberts
explained that Congress was attempting to create commerce by
requiring the individual mandate, but that the Commerce Clause limited
Congress “to regulate” already existing commerce.127 The “dissenters,”
made-up of Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel Alito, relied on a similar rationale to find
Congress’s action unconstitutional.128 Justice Ginsberg writing for the
dissent considered the issue under the “substantial effects” category and
concluded that the individual mandate was constitutional because “the
uninsured, as a class, substantially affect interstate commerce.”129
The importance of Sebelius is that, although the Court was deeply
divided, the Lopez three-category framework for Interstate Commerce
Clause issues, despite its complexity and malleability,130 was plainly
applied by the majority of the Court,131 and, indeed, not questioned by
any Justice except Thomas.132 Thus, it appears that the Lopez threecategory framework for the Interstate Commerce Clause is here to stay.
3. Legal Framework Inapplicable to the Foreign Commerce Clause
Overall there are two key points to take away concerning the
Interstate Commerce Clause legal framework, both of which suggest
125. Raich, 545 U.S. at 33–34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). In Sebelius, five
Justices (Roberts, C.J., and, writing separately, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J.)
concluded that the individual mandate was unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Id. at 2593, 2650. Five Justices (Roberts, C.J., and, writing separately, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, J.J.) concluded that the individual mandate was within
Congress’s power under the Taxing Clause. Id. at 2599.
127. Id. at 2586. (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“But Congress has never attempted to rely on
[the Commerce Clause] power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an
unwanted product . . . . The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of
commercial activity to be regulated.”) (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2617 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
130. See, e.g., Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 74, at 908 (critiquing the Lopez
framework as too flexible and subject to political whims).
131. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578, 2616, 2646, 2677 (Roberts, C.J., and, in a separate
opinion, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, J.J., plainly applying the Lopez framework;
Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, J.J., not questioning Lopez).
132. Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (determining that the “‘substantial effects’ test
under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers
and with the Court’s early Commerce Clauses cases”).
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that it is, and should remain, distinct from the Foreign Commerce
Clause legal framework. First, when the Court in Lopez identified the
three categories of commerce that Congress can regulate, the Court only
considered the history of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the cases
dealing with it. The Court did not consider the history of or any case
dealing with the Foreign Commerce Clause (or the Indian Commerce
Clause).133 Indeed, in key subsequent cases where the Court applied the
Lopez three-category framework, the Court made no significant
reference to congressional power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations.134 The lack of any mention of the Foreign Commerce Clause in
the numerous cases dealing with the Interstate Commerce Clause
strongly suggests that when the Court developed the legal framework in
the key cases discussed above, it was focused solely on commerce
among the states.135 Thus, there is no reason that the Interstate
Commerce Clause legal framework should be artificially superimposed
on the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Second, in developing the Interstate Commerce Clause’s threecategory framework set forth in Lopez, the Court considered as a “first
principle[]” that the federal government, which is limited in power,
should not encroach on state sovereignty. Specifically, instances where
Congress attempts to regulate noneconomic intrastate violent criminal
activity, such as possession of guns near a school zone as in Lopez or
gender-motivated violence as in Morrison, the Court is particularly
weary of invading that state’s general police power.136 As the Court
explained in Morrison: “[Our] concern . . . [is] that Congress might use
the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's
distinction between national and local authority.”137 There is, however,
133. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–59 (1995).
134. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (providing no analysis of Congress’s power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations or Indian tribes); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33
(2005); Pierce County, Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S.129,147–48 (2003); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2000).
135. As one scholar concluded:
[T]hroughout the years, the Justices have never recognized any important or
legitimate state interest in foreign affairs or dealings with American Indians.
Thus, when the Court was seeking to reserve powers for the states under the
Tenth Amendment, it had no cause to use that concept to restrict the federal
powers in these areas.
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 54, § 4.2(a), at 159.
136. “Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime
and vindication of its victims.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
137. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (explaining the Court’s concern underlying its decision in
both Lopez and Morrison). When laying out the Lopez framework for the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the Court explained its rationale:
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no such state sovereignty concern influencing the Foreign Commerce
Clause. Thus, as analyzed in the next section, the Framers and the courts
have determined that Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause is broader than under the Interstate Commerce Clause.138
Both of these conclusions suggest that the Interstate Commerce
Clause legal framework should not be superimposed onto the Foreign
Commerce Clause. Indeed, such a framework is convoluted139 and often
results in a fractured Court.140 Instead of superimposing the
complexities of the Interstate Commerce Clause framework onto the
Foreign Commerce Clause, a distinct (and straightforward) framework
should be developed. As set forth below, the Court has created a distinct
framework with respect to the Indian Commerce Clause. In applying a
distinct test for the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court explicitly
recognized that the state sovereignty concern imbedded in the Interstate
Commerce Clause is absent in Congress’s relationship with the Indian
tribes.141 Likewise, state sovereignty concerns are absent in Congress’s
relationship with foreign nations. Therefore, a separate legal framework
needs to be developed for the Foreign Commerce Clause that aptly
reflects the unique concerns of such a relationship.
The Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause: A Further Illustration
Why the Foreign Commerce Clause Should Have a Distinct Legal
Framework. The previous section exclusively considers cases where the

[T]he scope of the interstate commerce power “must be considered in the light
of our dual system of government and may not be so extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them,
in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
Laughlin Steel is a watershed case that significantly broadened the scope of Congress’s power
under the Interstate Commerce Clause when it held the National Labor Relations Act,
concerning collective bargaining, constitutional because the intrastate activities had “such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce.” Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37. Thus,
even in those cases where the Court gave Congress significant power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause, its underlying concern was federalism.
138. See infra Section II.B.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The Supreme
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence sometimes has yielded vague and uncertain legal
standards.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional
Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 579 (2008) [hereinafter Pushaw, Constitutional
Common Law] (explaining the development of the Interstate Commerce Clause legal framework
as “analytical chaos”).
140. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593, 2599, 2650
(2012) (upholding the constitutionality of Obamacare by a deeply fractured Court).
141. See infra Section II.C.
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Courts have interpreted the Interstate Commerce Clause as a grant of
congressional authority. The flipside of this power is the “dormant” or
“negative” Interstate Commerce Clause.142 It refers to the judicial power
to restrict states from passing laws that discriminate against or
excessively burden interstate commerce.143 The dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause is not specifically articulated in the Constitution;
however, the Court has determined that the doctrine is implied in and
central to the regulation of interstate commerce.144 Its purpose is to
prevent a state “from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing
the welfare of the Nation [by burdening] the flow of commerce across
its borders.”145 The dormant Interstate Commerce Clause, therefore,
reflects the Framer’s “central concern” and the “immediate reason for
calling the Constitutional Convention” which was “the conviction that
in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies
toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation.”146
Notably, in developing the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause test,
the Court focused on addressing this “economic Balkanization” issue
(free flow of commerce among the states). An issue which in no way
concerns the Foreign Commerce Clause, or any negative implications of
it. It is therefore not surprising that in dormant Interstate Commerce
142. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1981).
143. Generally, the rule for the dormant Commerce Clause has evolved into a balancing
test that makes state laws unconstitutional if the burden on interstate commerce outweighs local
benefits. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”); see also City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (citing to Pike’s balancing test); Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978) (explaining that when considering dormant
Interstate Commerce Clause issues, courts must consider “the weight and nature of the state
regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate
commerce”).
144. See, e.g., C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 401 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial
creation). The dormant Interstate Commerce Clause was first mentioned in Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), when Chief Justice Marshall explained in dicta that the power to
regulate interstate commerce “can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be
placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant.” Id. at 189.
145. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 180. The dormant Commerce Clause has two
objectives: it intends to create a national economic market by preventing states from imposing
barriers to trade; and, it fosters political cohesion by inhibiting states from imposing reciprocal
barriers. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the
Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227,
1227 (1995) (“The focus of the dormant commerce clause is on free trade among the states.”).
146. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979).
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Clause cases the Court has not analyzed or significantly addressed any
issues related to foreign commerce.147 Indeed, the only time the Court
mentioned the relationship between the two was to comment that the
market participation exception148 to the dormant Interstate Commerce
Clause doctrine did not apply to the Foreign Commerce Clause.149
Simply put, how state laws impact the flow of commerce between states
has no bearing on foreign commerce. It is for this reason that the Court
developed a more elaborate legal framework for the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause that is addressed more fully in the next section.150
4. Relevant Themes
Although the legal framework for the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Clauses should be distinct, there are two general themes,
which do not embody state sovereignty concerns that can be considered
across the Clauses. First, when analyzing the constitutional validity of a
statute, the Court considers congressional intent. The Court has advised
that if Congress intends to use its commerce power, Congress should
include an express “jurisdictional element”151 that establishes “its
connection” 152 to commerce. The Court has explained that, while not
147. See, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (analyzing a dormant Interstate Commerce Clause
issue without any significant reference to foreign commerce); Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at
180 (same); Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 348 n.17 (2008) (distinguishing a
case involving the negative implication of “foreign commerce” as applying a “more rigorous”
test than a case involving the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause (quoting South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984))).
148. The market participant exception to the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause provides
that when a state acts as a market participant, i.e. as a buyer or seller of goods or services, rather
than as a market regulator, the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause does not apply. See Reeves
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1980); Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 93.
149. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9 (explaining “that [negative] Commerce Clause scrutiny
[over state laws] may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged”);
see also Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 65 (1st Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom.
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (explaining “we are skeptical of
whether the market participation exception applies at all . . . to the Foreign Commerce Clause”).
150. See infra Section II.B.
151. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995) (explaining that while Congress
does not need to “‘make particularized findings in order to legislate,’” “as part of our
independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider
legislative findings”) (citations omitted); see also supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text
(discussing that in Lopez the lack of a jurisdictional element to Congress’s commerce power in
the statute was problematic). One court explained that when considering the reach of Congress’s
commerce power, the court considers, among other factors, whether the “statute contains an
express jurisdictional element involving interstate activity that might limit its reach,” and
whether “Congress has made specific findings regarding the effects of the prohibited activity on
interstate commerce.” United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 623 (10th Cir. 2006).
152. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 44 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining the
Lopez decision).
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determinative of constitutionality, “such a jurisdictional element would
lend support to the argument that [a federal law] is sufficiently tied
to . . . commerce to come within Congress’ authority.”153 Thus, when
Congress enacts a law under its foreign commerce power, it should
explicitly set forth a jurisdictional hook to the Foreign Commerce
Clause. Interestingly, when looking at laws with extraterritorial reach, it
is a hit-or-miss whether Congress does so.154
Second, as evidenced by precedent, Congress’s commerce power is
undoubtedly broad,155 but the Court has imposed some limits. In
determining the limits, the Court has considered the unique relationship
the federal government has with the impacted body. Thus, just as the
Court limits Congress’s interstate commerce power to reflect the unique
relationship Congress has with the states,156 so the limits on Congress’s
foreign commerce power should reflect the unique relationship
Congress has with foreign nations. When considering what legal
framework applies to the Foreign Commerce Clause, the court should
keep these two themes in mind.157
In sum, although there a few relevant themes, history and precedent
show that when the Court developed the legal framework for the
Interstate Commerce Clause, both dormant and non-dormant, it did not
consider the Foreign Commerce Clause. Instead, the Court was focused
on state sovereignty and federalism concerns; such concerns are
completely lacking in Foreign Commerce Clause cases which suggests
that this power should be broader.158 Yet, as examined in the next
section, that framework is what lower courts inexplicably apply when
confronted with Foreign Commerce Clause challenges to federal laws
with extraterritorial reach.
B. Option #2: The Foreign Commerce Clause Legal Framework—In
Disarray
The Court has only decided a few cases that squarely deal with the
Foreign Commerce Clause.159 As discussed more fully below, those
153. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598–99 (2000) (noting positively that
Congress set forth a jurisdictional nexus to its interstate commerce power in the statute at
question, but finding that congressional intent alone failed to make the statute constitutional).
154. See infra Appendix A (listing which federal laws with extraterritorial reach set forth
an explicit jurisdictional component to Congress’s commerce power).
155. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (noting that “it is
now well established that Congress has broad authority under the [Commerce] Clause”).
156. See supra Subsection II.A.2 (discussing the current legal landscape of the Interstate
Commerce Clause).
157. See infra Part III (considering a new test for the Foreign Commerce Clause).
158. See infra Section II.B (setting forth the numerous cases finding the Congress’s foreign
commerce power to be broader than its interstate commerce power).
159. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (citing
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cases primarily address the “negative implications” of the Foreign
Commerce Clause that addresses the constitutionality of state laws—
i.e., the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Thus, while the Court has
addressed whether a state statute is constitutional,160 the Court has never
addressed whether a federal law regulating the conduct of a U.S. citizen
in a foreign nation is constitutional under the Foreign Commerce
Clause.161 This lack of guidance has left lower courts in disarray. As
scrutinized below, a majority of the courts, without much explanation,
simply apply the Interstate Commerce Clause’s three-category
framework as articulated in Lopez without acknowledging that the
underlying concern of the framework (state sovereignty) is a non-issue
for the Foreign Commerce Clause. Some courts, however, have rejected
this framework, creating a circuit split. These courts have adopted a new
“tenable nexus”162 test for the Foreign Commerce Clause, but, because
this new test is without any limits, it is problematic.163
As with the previous section, this section first explores the historical
origins and treatment of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Next, this
Section will examine the current legal landscape, starting with the
dormant aspect of the Foreign Commerce Clause because it has the
clearest application. As for the (non-dormant) Foreign Commerce
Clause, two groups of cases emerge: those where federal laws regulate
trade with foreign nations; and those where federal laws have
extraterritorial reach. This second group of cases is where the circuits
split and most of the confusion lies. This second group, which concerns
the reach of the Foreign Commerce Clause over U.S. citizens who travel
abroad, can be further divided into three lines of cases. The analyses in
all three lines of cases, however, miss the mark as the courts fail fully to
consider the history or the text of the Foreign Commerce Clause.
1. History
History shows that there were reasons, distinct from those
underlying the Interstate Commerce Clause, why the Founders gave
Congress the power to regulate commerce “with foreign Nations.”164
The need for federal uniformity in the context of foreign commerce
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321,
330 (1903); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 187–89 (1983).
160. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450–51.
161. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006).
162. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114.
163. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1120 (Ferguson, C.J., dissenting); Daniel Bolia, Comment,
Policing Americans Abroad: the PROTECT Act, the Case Against Michael Lewis Clark, and
the Use of the Foreign Commerce Clause in an Increasingly Flat World, 48 S. TEX. L. REV.
797, 822–23 (2007).
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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policy was of great importance to the Founders and one of the major
reasons for the Constitutional Convention.165 One of the most glaring
defects in the Articles of Confederation was the federal government’s
inability to regulate foreign commerce.166 The inability to regulate
commerce with foreign nations resulted in a depression of the American
economy as foreign nations flooded the colonies with cheap goods,
while sales of American goods abroad lagged due to astronomical
import duties.167 Although initially some southern states expressed
concern over strong congressional power to regulate foreign commerce
because they feared that the North might control Congress, the inability
of the Nation to speak with one voice, particularly in response to
discriminatory British trade, trumped such concerns. 168 As James
Madison explained, in order to remain competitive, the United States
needed “uniformity” in dealing with “the ports of foreign nations, a
stipulation of privileges reciprocal to those enjoyed by the subjects of
such nations in the ports of the United States.”169
165. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (“The sole
purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution
was ‘to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations
and trade of the said states; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulation
may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony . . . .’”); Robert J.
Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water’s Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign
Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (2001) (“Courts and legal scholars have long recognized that
the desire for an effective national authority to regulate foreign commerce—more specifically,
an authority that would enable the states to take concerted action to resist and retaliate against
exclusionary British trade practices—was one of the primary causes of the agitation for the
Constitution of 1787.”) (citation omitted).
166. STORY, supra note 67, at 239.
167. See id. at 241–42. Part of the reason duties abroad were so high was Congress’s
inability to effectively negotiate commercial treaties to guarantee reciprocally low import duties.
Id. Because foreign nations were aware that Congress did not have the power to assure that all
states would act uniformly in accordance with the treaty terms, they refused to enter into
reciprocal import agreements. Id. at 242–43. Moreover, because the several states acted in their
independent self-interest and competed to attract foreign vendors, often foreign goods were not
subject to duty, thus negating any incentive a foreign nation might have to negotiate such a
treaty. Id.
168. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.2, at 159–60 (7th
ed. 2004). These scholars note that “[t]he primary concern over congressional power in the
international area came from the Southern states who feared that a broad power might be used to
restrict the importation of slaves . . . [but this concern] was eliminated by expressly prohibiting
Congress from banning the importation of slaves until 1808.” Id. Southern states also feared that
the North might control the Congress and thereby favor their trade centers, ‘[t]hus Section 9 of
Article I insures that Congress will not tax exports or give preference to certain ports in matters
of foreign trade.” Id. at 160; see also Delahunty, supra note 165, at 17–18 (explaining that the
Founders “feared the lack of power” of the Nation to speak with a unified voice to foreign
nations “would undo the victory won by the Revolutionary War; lead to the disintegration of the
Union . . . and invite European intervention in U.S. affairs”).
169. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)1, 105 (1824); see also Colangelo, supra note
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The notion that the federal government needed the power to regulate
foreign commerce with one voice was of little debate among the
Founders.170 For example, Madison explained: “This class of powers
[including the regulation of foreign commerce] forms an obvious and
essential branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation
in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”171
Madison believed it was such an “obvious” power that “[t]he regulation
of foreign commerce . . . has been too fully discussed to need additional
proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal
administration.”172 Likewise, Hamilton noted “intercourse with foreign
countries” is “one of those points about which there is least room to
entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the
most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the
subject.”173
Even though the Foreign Commerce Clause became part of the
Constitution “in parallel phrases” with the Interstate Commerce Clause,
the Court has concluded, “there is evidence that the Founders intended
the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.”174 Indeed,
the Court has consistently stated that Congress’s power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause is exclusive and broader than its power
under the Interstate Commerce Clause.175 Indeed, this view was
39, at 963–64 (explaining that the “Founders’ intent is plain” that the new federal government
had to have exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce).
170. See Delahunty, supra note 165, at 25 (concluding, after an extensive look at the
origins of the Foreign Commerce Clause, that “the Framers saw an overriding need to ensure
that the national government had the power to enact uniform rules governing our commercial
relations with foreign countries” and that such power “be vested in Congress”).
171. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
172. Id. at 266.
173. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
174. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
175. See, e.g., id. (“Foreign commerce is pre-eminently a matter of national concern.”)
(emphasis added); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (“In
international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United
States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.”); Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904) (describing congressional power to regulate foreign
commerce concerning the importation of tea as “exclusive and absolute”) (emphasis added);
Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (“Laws which concern the exterior
relations of the United States with other nations and governments are general in their nature, and
should proceed exclusively from the legislative authority of the nation.”) (emphasis added);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 227 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (explaining that
power over foreign commerce “must be exclusive” because “it can reside but in one potentate;
and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the State
to act upon”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655,
658–60 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (noting that the “power to regulate foreign
commerce is vested in Congress, not in the executive or the courts . . . . Imports from a foreign
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articulated nearly two centuries ago when the Chief Justice John
Marshall explained: “[i]t has, we believe, been universally admitted,
that [the Foreign Commerce Clause] comprehend[s] every species of
commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations.”176 The Court has explained that this power is greater because,
while “Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce may be
restricted by considerations of federalism and state sovereignty,” there
are no such concerns related to “Congress’ power to regulate foreign
commerce.”177
The 1903 Lottery Case178 is a good illustration of how the early
Court, although divided on the reach of the Interstate Commerce
Clause, collectively agreed that Congress had broader power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause. In the Lottery Case, a deeply divided Court
(five-to-four) held that Congress acted within its power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause to pass a law that prohibited trafficking
lottery tickets across state lines.179 Notably, the four dissenting justices,
who would have struck down the congressional act under the Interstate
Commerce Clause, indicated that they would not place such restrictions
under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The dissenters posed this
question: “It is argued that the power to regulate commerce among the
several states is the same as the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and with the Indian tribes. But is its scope the same?”180
They answered this question in the negative explaining that the “power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and the power to regulate
interstate commerce are to be taken diverso intuitu.” 181 The Interstate
Commerce Clause “was intended to secure equality and freedom in
commercial intercourse as between the states, not to permit the creation
of impediments to such intercourse,” but the Foreign Commerce Clause
“clothed Congress with that power over international commerce,
pertaining to a sovereign nation in its intercourse with foreign nations,
and subject, generally speaking, to no implied or reserved power in the
states.”182 The dissenters concluded that “laws which would be
country are foreign commerce subject to regulation, so far as this country is concerned, by
Congress alone”).
176. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193.
177. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 n.13 (citing Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 842 (1976)).
178. Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 330 (1903).
179. Id..
180. Id. at 333 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Id. In his dissent, Justice Fuller also explained that the “same view must be taken as to
commerce with Indian tribes. There is no reservation of police powers or any other to a foreign
nation or to an Indian tribe, and the scope of the power is not the same as that over interstate
commerce.” Id. at 334.
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necessary and proper in the one case would not be necessary or proper
in the other.”183 Thus, while the Court was (and still is)184 divided over
the Interstate Commerce Clause power, there is general consensus that
the Foreign Commerce Clause power is expansive.
This consensus has been the same in more recent cases where the
whole Court has implicitly assumed that congressional power to
regulate foreign commerce is broad. For example, in the 1993 case of
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California185 the Court found that foreign
companies acting in foreign countries could be held liable for violations
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Implicit in the Court’s opinion was that
the Sherman Antitrust Act was a permissible exercise of congressional
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Justice Scalia, dissenting
on a statutory issue, reveals how the Court made this constitutional
assumption: “There is no doubt, of course, that Congress possesses
legislative jurisdiction over the acts alleged in this complaint: Congress
has broad power under Article I, § 8, cl. 3, ‘[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations,’ and this Court has repeatedly upheld its power to
make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial
boundaries where United States interests are affected.”186
In sum, when considering what legal framework to apply to Foreign
Commerce Clause issues, two important themes emerge from the
history of the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Court’s early treatment
of the clause. First, the Founders and the Court understood that the
federalism concerns underlying the Interstate Commerce Clause did not
underlie the Foreign Commerce Clause. Second, because of the lack of
federalism concerns, the Court has consistently interpreted
congressional power under the Foreign Commerce Clause to be greater
than the Interstate Commerce Clause.
2. Current Legal Landscape
Although the Court has consistently agreed that Foreign Commerce
Clause power is broad, the consensus has been primarily built around
those cases where the Court has considered what state action violates
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Specifically, the Court has
applied a “one voice” test to find state action unconstitutional.187 As far
as the reach of Congress’s power under the (non-dormant) Foreign
Commerce Clause to regulate the conduct of U.S. citizen abroad, the
Court has not articulated any test. This lack of guidance has caused
disarray in lower courts, although the courts do rely on some themes
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 333.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).
Id. at 813–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3

1172

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

articulated in dormant Foreign Commerce Clause precedent.188 Thus,
this Section first discusses the Court’s one voice test for the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause, and then tackles the confusion among the
lower courts concerning the (non-dormant) Foreign Commerce Clause
and why a new legal framework is necessary.
a. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause Test: “One Voice”
Like the Interstate Commerce Clause,189 the Foreign Commerce
Clause also has a dormant aspect. The dormant power is derived from
the negative implication that states are barred from enacting laws that
discriminate against foreign commerce because the Constitution
explicitly gives Congress the power to regulate it.190 The dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause one voice test has had its own distinct
development “having been used primarily as a tool to limit the ability of
the several states to intervene in matters affecting international
trade.”191 The one voice test encompasses “the Framers’ overriding
concern that ‘the Federal Government must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.’”192
188. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 961
(2010).
189. See supra Section II.A.
190. Leanne M. Wilson, Note, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After
Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 760 (2007). Wilson explains:
The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is the analogue of the dormant
Interstate Commerce Clause (commonly referred to as the dormant or negative
Commerce Clause). Both get their name from the fact that there is no text in the
Constitution that prohibits the states from regulating interstate or foreign
commerce. But the Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, and the Court has read a negative aspect into
each clause, essentially barring states from passing legislation that
discriminates against commerce.
Id. at 746 n.4.
191. United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 117711, 2012 WL 2197195 (U.S. June 18, 2012).
192. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449; see also Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276,
283 (1976). In Michelin, the Court explained the importance of the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause power to the Founders:
“One of the major defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a compelling
reason for the calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was the fact
that the Articles essentially left the individual States free to burden
commerce . . . with foreign countries very much as they pleased. Before 1787 it
was commonplace for seaboard States with port facilities to derive revenue to
defray the costs of state and local governments by imposing taxes on imported
goods destined for customers in other States. At the same time, there was no
secure source of revenue for the central government.
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In the preeminent dormant Foreign Commerce Clause case, Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,193 the Court articulated the “one
voice” test—a test which provides that the United States must be able to
respond with one voice in matters of foreign commerce. In this case, the
Court held that a California ad valorem property tax of Japanese cargo
ships was unconstitutional. The ships, owned by Japanese companies
subject to Japanese tax, were operated exclusively in foreign
commerce.194 The Court found California’s tax unconstitutional
“because it prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one
voice’ in international trade . . . [which is] inconsistent with Congress’
power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’”195 The Court
worried that other states might follow California’s example (which
Oregon, in fact, did196) subjecting “foreign owned containers . . . to
various degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which American
ports they enter.”197 Multiple taxation would also disadvantage the
country of Japan resulting in the “risk of retaliation” which would be
“felt by the Nation as a whole.”198 The Court concluded that
“California, by its unilateral act, cannot be permitted to place these
impediments before this Nation’s conduct of its foreign relation and its
foreign trade.”199 Such taxation made speaking with one voice
“impossible.”200 The Court explained that its decision was limited to the
“negative implications of Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations’ under the Commerce Clause.”201 In other words, the
one voice test is specific to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.
There are some limits to the one voice test. For example, in
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court,
applying the one voice test, found a California tax did not violate the
Id.
193. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451–54.
194. Id. at 436.
195. Id. at 453–54 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 453 (citing Ore. Op. Atty. Gen. No.7709 (Jan. 31, 1979)).
197. Id. at 453.
198. Id.
199. Id. In addition to the one voice concern, the Court also found the state tax
unconstitutional because it resulted in impermissible “multiple taxation of the instrumentalities
of foreign commerce.” Id.. Specifically, Japan was within its rights to levy a property tax on the
containers (and did so); thus, California’s tax created a “double tax.” Id. at 452. The Court
explained that multiple taxation, which is “offensive to the Commerce Clause,” created specific
problems in the context of foreign commerce. Id. at 446. Unlike interstate commerce where the
Court could require “that taxes be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions, so that no
instrumentality of commerce is subjected to more than one tax on its full value,” such full
apportionment could not be enforced “when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign.” Id.
at 447.
200. Id. at 453.
201. Id. at 449 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3).
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dormant Foreign Commerce Clause because it did not lead to
“significant foreign retaliation.”202 In Container Corporation, a
domestic company with foreign subsidiaries challenged California’s
unitary tax, an income tax on corporations calculated by the amount of
their worldwide business that took place in California.203 The Court
found the tax did not violate the one voice rule because the state tax
merely had “foreign resonances” and not one that “implicate[d] foreign
affairs.”204 The Court distinguished Container Corporation from Japan
Line by pointing out that, because there was little concern for the risk of
retaliation against the United States by a foreign government as to what
might be perceived as unfair tax by an individual state, the California
business tax had an “attenuated” impact on foreign relations.205
The most important point of Japan Line and Container Corporation
is that in developing the one voice test and its outer limits, the Court did
not simply superimpose the exact legal framework of the dormant
Interstate Commerce Clause.206 Instead, the Court created a “more
elaborate” 207 test relying on the “Framers’ overriding concern” that the
federal government be unified in its regulation of foreign commerce.208
As one author concluded, “the justifications for the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause—fear of foreign retaliation and states unduly
interfering with foreign affairs—are different from the justifications for

202. 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
203. Id. at 162–63.
204. Id. at 194.
205. Id. at 195. See also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 302, 330
(1994) (finding the same state regulation as in Container Corp. valid under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause when the challenge was brought by a foreign corporation); Wardair Can., Inc.
v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986) (finding a Florida tax on aviation fuel valid
under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause). In some recent cases, the Court has opted to
analyze state regulations of foreign commerce solely as a preemption issue instead of a dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause issue. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 412–13,
420 (2003) (finding the California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999, which
required disclosure about Holocaust-era insurance policies, invalid solely on preemption
grounds even though the Ninth Circuit also analyzed it under the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371, 388 (2000) (finding the
Massachusetts Burma Law, which prohibited state agencies from doing business with
corporations who did business with Burma, invalid solely on preemption grounds even though
the First Circuit also analyzed it under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Wilson, supra
note 190, at 766–67, 776 (arguing that “Garamendi and Crosby have changed the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause” so that it should be “abandoned” even though neither case analyzes
the doctrine).
206. See infra Section II.A (discussing the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause).
207. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451 (“For these reasons, we believe that an inquiry more
elaborate . . . is necessary when a State seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign, rather than
of interstate, commerce.”) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 449.
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the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause.”209
Simply put, the Court did not strictly impose the legal framework of
the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause onto the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause. It makes sense that the Court did not do so. As
demonstrated in Japan Line and its progeny,210 there are separate and
distinct reasons underlying the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause legal
framework. Likewise then, there is no reason to strictly impose
Interstate Commerce Clause rules (e.g., the Lopez three-category
framework) on the Foreign Commerce Clause. Yet, as addressed in the
next sub-section, that is precisely what a majority of lower courts have
mistakenly done.
b. (Non-dormant) Foreign Commerce Clause: Circuit Splits
Although not explicitly recognized by the courts, when tackling the
(non-dormant) Foreign Commerce Clause, two separate lines of cases
emerge. Each line of cases analyzes distinct conduct. The first type of
conduct concerns U.S. economic relationships with foreign countries
and includes trade related matters like federal embargos and tariffs. This
type of conduct is the flip side to the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause because it implicates the concern that the nation be able to speak
with “one voice.”211 There is less confusion on how to analyze
Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause with this type of
conduct. The second type of conduct concerns congressional power to
regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens who travel in foreign commerce
(the primary concern of this article). This second type of conduct raises
interesting and novel issues – issues on which the Supreme Court has
never spoken, leaving the lower courts without any guidance and
resulting in circuit splits and convoluted opinions.
i. Conduct Related to Trade with Foreign Nations
In the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United
States,212 the Court squarely addressed congressional power to enact a
209. Wilson, supra note 190, at 786.
210. After Japan Line, the Court applied the one voice test to numerous dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause cases, all of which involved a state tax statute being challenged. See, e.g.,
Barclay’s Bank, 512 U.S. at 311 (“A [state] tax affecting foreign commerce therefore raises [a
concern dealing with] . . . the Federal Government’s capacity to ‘speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.’”) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted); Wardair, 477 U.S. at 9 (applying the one voice test to Florida tax on aviation fuel); Itel
Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 74–76 (1993) (applying the one voice test to
Tennessee tax on leases of containers used in international shipping); Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 186, 193–96 (1983) (applying the one voice to California
corporate franchise tax).
211. See supra Section II.B (on the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause).
212. 289 U.S. 48, 56, 58–59 (1933).
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federal statute under the Foreign Commerce Clause. In this case, the
University challenged the payment under the Tariff Act of 1922
claiming that it was a tax for which the school should be exempt from
paying.213 The University’s argument that the tariff constituted a tax
was rejected because in the Act itself Congress had created a
jurisdictional hook to its power to regulate foreign commerce.214 A
unanimous Court upheld the Tariff Act as a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Foreign Commerce Clause stating in
sweeping terms that foreign commerce encompasses “‘every species of
commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations.’”215 The Court went so far as to use language reminiscent of the
Indian Commerce Clause, finding that Congress’s power to regulate
foreign commerce was “exclusive and plenary.”216
Thus, when it comes to enacting federal tariffs,217 import or export
duties, 218 embargos, 219 or other trade-related federal activities, the
Court has determined that Congress’s power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause is very broad. Indeed, “[n]o sort of trade can be
carried on between this country and any other, to which this power does
not extend.” 220
Importantly, and consistent with the thesis of this article, in the
Board of Trustees, the Court did not impose the Interstate Commerce
Clause (or the Indian Commerce Clause) legal framework on the
Foreign Commerce Clause. This makes practical sense. For example,
the Court has noted that Congress could enact an embargo related to
foreign commerce, but could not enact an embargo related to interstate
commerce.221 In drawing this distinction between the foreign and
213. Id. at 56.
214. Id. (“The Tariff Act of 1922 is entitled, ‘An Act to provide revenue, to regulate
commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States, and for other
purposes.’ The Congress thus asserted that it was exercising its constitutional authority ‘to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’”) (citations omitted).
215. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933) (citing Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)1, 193–94 (1824)).
216. Bd. Of Trs. Of Univ. of Ill., 289 U.S. at 56; see also infra Part II.C (discussing the
Indian Commerce Clause).
217. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 289 U.S. at 57 (“The Congress may determine what
articles may be imported into this country and the terms upon which importation is
permitted . . . . If the Congress saw fit to lay an embargo or to prohibit altogether the
importation of specified articles . . . Congress may . . .”) (citations omitted).
218. See id. at 58.
219. See id. at 57; see also Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434
(1932) (stating in dicta that the Congress has the power to enact embargos when regulating
foreign commerce).
220. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 289 U.S. at 56 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824)).
221. Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, 286 U.S. at 434 (stating in dicta: “In the regulation of foreign
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interstate commerce powers, the Court emphasized that congressional
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause “may be broader than”
under the Interstate Commerce Clause.222
ii. Conduct of U.S. Citizens who Travel in Foreign Commerce
Since the Court concluded in Board of Trustees that Congress’s
foreign commerce power is “exclusive and plenary,”223 why advocate
for a new legal framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause? Perhaps
in the context of pure trade-related commercial transactions concerning
foreign nations, such broad power makes sense because it allows the
Nation to speak with one clear voice in its trade interactions with
foreign nations. However, with recent globalization, a new issue has
arisen—how broad is Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause to regulate the behavior of U.S. citizens who have traveled to
foreign nations? If the foreign commerce power was “exclusive and
plenary,” then in such situations Congress would have an all
encompassing power which may allow, for example, the prohibition of
a U.S. citizen from eating pasta in Italy. This outcome is surely not what
the Founders had in mind, nor is it practical.
Lower courts agree. As discussed in this Section, when such issues
have arisen, the lower courts have not entertained the notion that the
Foreign Commerce Clause allows such boundless power over U.S.
citizens abroad. A majority of the lower courts, however, swing too
much in the opposite direction and impose the legal framework of the
Interstate Commerce Clause on the Foreign Commerce Clause without
considering the historical and precedential differences between the two.
What test, then, for laws with extraterritorial reach? Generally, there
are three approaches that the lower courts have taken: (1) mechanically,
without much explanation, apply the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework as articulated in Lopez; (2) apply a new “tenable nexus” test;
and (3) recognize that the Congress has broader power to regulate
foreign commerce, but still apply the Lopez framework. This Article
will analyze each approach to show that none of these approaches
accurately analyzes the scope of Congress’s power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.
Here is a chart that shows the diversity of the approaches that the
lower courts have applied in their approach to Foreign Commerce
Clause issues concerning laws with extraterritorial reach. For example,
commerce an embargo is admissible; but it reasonably cannot be thought that, in respect of
legitimate and unobjectionable articles, an embargo would be admissible as a regulation of
interstate commerce, since the primary purpose of the clause in respect of the latter was to
secure freedom of commercial intercourse among the states.”).
222. Id.
223. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 289 U.S. at 56.
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not only is there a recent (in 2011) circuit split between the Third and
Ninth Circuits, but within the circuits themselves different tests are
being applied without explanation. As illustrated in the chart below, in
the Third Circuit, Pendleton applies a different test than Bianchi, and in
the Ninth Circuit, Cummings applies a different test than Clark. Each
category of cases will be explained in turn.
Approach to
Foreign Commerce Clause Issues

Case (Court and Year)

1. Mechanically applying the Lopez
framework without explanation:

• Cummings (9th Cir.
2002)224
• Schneider (E.D. Pa.
2011)225

2. Adopting a new “tenable nexus”
test:
3. Applying the Lopez framework,
but recognizing Congress has
broader power to regulate foreign
commerce:

• Bianchi (3d Cir. 2010)226
• Clark (9th Cir. 2006)227
• Pendleton (3d Cir. 2011)228
• Bredimus (5th Cir. 2003)229
• Martinez (W.D. Tex.
2009)230
• Flath (E.D. Wis. 2012)231

Approach #1: Mechanically Applying the Lopez Framework without
explanation
In United States v. Cummings,232 the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the International Parental kidnapping Crime Act
(IPKCA), which criminalizes the removal of “a child from the United
States . . . with [the] intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental

224. United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 895 (2002).
225. United States v. Schneider, 817 F. Supp. 2d 586, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
226. United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 161–62 (3rd Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1044 (2011).
227. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1334 (2007).
228. United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2771 (2012).
229. United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204–08 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1044 (2004).
230. United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 805 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
231. United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
232. United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002).
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rights.”233 Although the issue was raised as a Foreign Commerce Clause
issue, the Ninth Circuit mechanically applied the Lopez Interstate
Commerce Clause framework without any explanation as to why this
framework should be applied.234 Relying on Lopez, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that IPKCA was a permissible exercise of congressional
authority to regulate “the channels of foreign commerce.”235 The court
focused on the fact that by “retaining” a child in a foreign country, the
child is prevented from using the channels of foreign commerce (e.g., a
plane or some other means of transportation to travel back to the United
States).236 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit also noted that “although not
necessarily required, we note that IPKCA inherently contains a
jurisdictional element that ensures that the wrongfully retained children
passed through the channels of foreign commerce.”237 Thus, even
though the Ninth Circuit may have applied the wrong test to this
Foreign Commerce Clause issue, it did correctly note that one common
theme between the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clauses is that the
U.S. Supreme Court favors statutes that articulate a jurisdictional nexus
to commerce.238

233. 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2006).
234. Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1048–49. In explaining the rule, the Ninth Circuit first cited to
well-known Interstate Commerce Clause cases, Heart of Atlantic Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942). See supra
notes 80–81, 95 and accompanying text (explaining these cases). The Ninth Circuit then set
forth the three categories articulated in Lopez and concluded that IPKCA would be
constitutional so long as it fell “into one of the delineated ‘categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power.’” Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1049 (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
235. Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1050.
236. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained its channels of commerce analysis as follows:
If a child is wrongfully retained in a foreign country, he or she cannot freely
use the channels of commerce to return. Congress has authority to prevent
individuals from impeding commerce . . . and, as to those who “retain” children
outside of the United States, to prevent them from traveling back to this country
via the channels of commerce. Thus, by wrongfully retaining his children in
Germany, Cummings is interfering with the use of the channels of foreign
commerce; IPKCA removes an impediment to travel and makes possible
unrestricted use of the channels of commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 1051 (“Indeed, the Lopez statute’s fatal flaw was that it contained ‘no
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm
possession in question affect[ed] interstate commerce.’”) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
238. See supra Subsection II.A.4.
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In recent cases, the PROTECT Act,239 another federal statute
regulating U.S. citizens’ behavior abroad, has been repeatedly
challenged under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The PROTECT Act
allows for the prosecution of U.S. citizens who travel in foreign
commerce and engage in “any illicit sexual conduct” with a minor.240
There are two important statutory classifications to point out. First,
“illicit sexual conduct” is either commercial or noncommercial in
nature. 241 Second, under section 2423(b), the Act prohibits “travel in
foreign commerce, for the purposes of engaging in any illicit sexual
conduct;” and under section 2423(c), the Act prohibits “travel in foreign
commerce, and engag[ing] in any illicit sexual conduct.” Legislative
history shows that section (c) was specifically amended to remove the
intent requirement stated in section (b).242 This distinction is important
because under section (b) Congress is regulating the improper use of the
means of foreign commerce243—traveling in the channels (like on a
plane) with the improper purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct;
while under section (c), Congress is regulating anyone who travels
abroad, without any specific intent, and then after the travel is
complete—and thus is no longer in the channels for foreign
commerce—engages in illicit sexual conduct. As discussed in the next
few cases, because section (c) does not involve the regulation of the
means of foreign commerce, it has raised the most difficult issues
concerning Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause. To
compound the difficulties, a section (c) conviction involving
noncommercial sex acts with children (as opposed to commercial acts)
239. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-021, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (“Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. Any United
States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and
engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”). Section (a) defines the protected “person” as a
minor “who has not attained the age of 18.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f) provides:
As used in this section, the term ‘illicit sexual conduct’ means (1) a sexual act
(as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be
in violation of chapter 109A [18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)-(b), which encompasses
non-commercial sexual abuse] . . . ; or (2) any commercial sex act (as defined
in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.
242. Members of Congress were concerned that § 2423(b) would not adequately deter
child-sex tourists because prosecutors had an “extremely difficult” time “proving intent in such
cases.” 148 Cong. Rec. 3884 (2002) (stating that intent is particularly “difficult to prove without
direct arrangement booked through obvious child sex-tour networks.”). Therefore, § 2423(c)
was enacted.
243. See infra Section III.C of this Article (discussing the “means” of foreign commerce).
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raises the issue of whether Congress is regulating commerce at all.
In United States v. Schneider, the district court upheld the conviction
under section (b) of the PROTECT Act of a U.S. citizen who traveled to
Russia with the intent to engage in noncommercial illicit sexual conduct
with a young boy.244 The district court, rejecting defendant’s challenge
that his conviction violated the Foreign Commerce Clause, found it was
a proper regulation of the channels of commerce. 245 The district court
relied on precedent that applied the Lopez Interstate Commerce Clause
framework without any explanation as to why this framework should
apply to a Foreign Commerce Clause issue. 246
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the unique history
of the Foreign Commerce Clause.247 It also ignores the fact that the
Court never explicitly or implicitly stated that the Lopez Interstate
Commerce Clause framework (or the negative implications of it) should
apply to the Foreign Commerce Clause.248 Indeed, if anything Japan
Line and Board of Trustees have shown that the Court is heading down
a distinct path when such issues arise.249 At the very least, courts should
recognize the historical and precedential distinctions among the three
commerce clauses and explain why they are adopting a certain
approach.
Approach #2: Adopting a New “Tenable Nexus” Test
Although in the 2002 Cummings case, the Ninth Circuit took
approach one (mechanically applying the Lopez Interstate Commerce
Clause framework to the Foreign Commerce Clause), four years later, in
United States v. Clark, the Ninth Circuit rejected “slavishly marching
down the path of grafting the interstate commerce framework onto
foreign commerce” and took “a global, commonsense approach.”250 In
Clark, the defendant was convicted under the commercial prong of the
PROTECT Act for paying to molest young boys in Cambodia. During
the timeframe in which he molested the boys “on a regular basis,”
244. United States v. Schneider, 817 F. Supp. 2d 586, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
245. Id. (finding § 2423(b) of the PROTECT Act a valid exercise of congressional
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause because it was upheld as constitutional under
Congress’s power to “regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce”) (emphasis
added).
246. Id. (citing United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 470 (3rd Cir. 2006) (upholding
the conviction under Section (b) of the PROTECT Act because the defendant engaged in
“interstate travel” by using the Internet, a “channel of interstate commerce,” to attempt to induce
a minor to cross state lines, from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, to engage in illicit sexual activity)
(citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3rd Cir. 2006)).).
247. See supra Section II.B.
248. See supra Section II.A.
249. See supra Section II.B.
250. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Instead of slavishly
marching down the path of grafting the interstate commerce framework onto foreign commerce,
we step back and take a global, commonsense approach to the circumstance presented here.”).
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defendant “primarily resided in Cambodia,” but maintained some
contacts with the United States, including an annual visit.251 In
upholding his conviction, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected applying
the Lopez framework to a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge of the
PROTECT Act, explaining that “forcing foreign commerce cases into
the domestic commerce rubric is a bit like one of the stepsisters trying
to don Cinderella’s glass slipper.”252
In rejecting the Lopez framework, the Ninth Circuit explained that
“[a]s with the Indian Commerce Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause
has followed its own distinct evolutionary path.”253 In exploring this
“distinct” path, the court made two observations. First, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the underlying federalism concerns of the Interstate
Commerce Clause were absent: “Federalism and state sovereignty
concerns do not restrict Congress’s power over foreign commerce.”254
Second, the court noted that the Supreme Court was “unwavering” in
finding the foreign commerce power to be broad and that there was “no
counterpart to Lopez or Morrison in the foreign commerce realm that
would signal a retreat from the Court’s expansive reading of the Foreign
Commerce Clause.”255
With this in mind, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a distinct and
new test should be applied to Foreign Commerce Clause issues: analyze
the text of the statute “to discern whether it has a constitutionally
tenable nexus with foreign commerce.”256 In applying this test to the
PROTECT Act, the court concluded that the “nexus requirement [was]
met to a constitutionally sufficient degree” because “[t]he combination
of Clark’s travel in foreign commerce [from the United States to
Cambodia] and his conduct of an illicit commercial sex act in Cambodia
shortly thereafter put[] the statute squarely within Congress’s Foreign
Commerce Clause authority.”257
The Ninth Circuit, in passing, recognized its inconsistent analysis of
the Foreign Commerce Clause noting that in Cummings it used the
Interstate Commerce Clause legal framework to analyze whether
IPKCA violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.258 The Ninth Circuit,
251. Id. at 1103.
252. Id. at 1116.
253. Id. at 1113.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1114.
257. Id. at 1116–17.
258. Id. at 1116 (noting that in “previous decisions [we] have recognized that Congress
legitimately exercises its authority to regulate the channels of commerce where a crime
committed on foreign soil is necessarily tied to travel in foreign commerce, even where the
actual use of the channels has ceased”) (citing United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046,
1050–51 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text (explaining
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however, did not explain if Clark overruled Cummings or if Clark was
distinguishable from Cummings. Thus, as it stands now, the Ninth
Circuit has embraced two approaches to Foreign Commerce Clause
issues: apply the Lopez framework or apply a tenable nexus test.
Inexplicably, the Third Circuit has also created this same confusion
within its own circuit. In Bianchi259 the Third Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of both the commercial and noncommercial prongs of
the PROTECT Act. In upholding the constitutionality of the commercial
prong, the Third Circuit cited to Clark.260 In upholding the
constitutionality of the noncommercial prong of the PROTECT Act, the
court concluded that the defendant “simply [had] not made the required
‘plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds’ by
enacting that prong of the statute.”261 Although the court did not
explicitly apply a tenable nexus test, the “plain showing” language
required a similar analysis. Despite this analysis, a year later, in
Pendelton, the Third Circuit applied the Lopez framework and found
that the non-commercial prong of the PROTECT Act violated the
Foreign Commerce Clause. The Pendelton court did not explain its
reason for applying a different test or for its opposite holding in
Bianchi. Indeed, the Pendleton court did not even mention Bianchi.262
Thus, both the Ninth and Third Circuits have applied the tenable
nexus test (or as put in Bianchi, the “plain showing” test), even though
different tests were later applied in other cases within the same circuit.
This inconsistency suggests that courts are uneasy to apply this new
test. Indeed, as the Third Circuit put it inPendelton: “Although we agree
with [the Ninth Circuit] that the Interstate Commerce Clause developed
to address ‘unique federalism concerns’ that are absent in the foreign
commerce context, we are hesitant to dispose of Lopez’s ‘time-tested’
framework without further guidance from the Supreme Court.”263
The Pendelton court is right; the tenable nexus is problematic. It
suggests that by simply traveling to a foreign country by plane (or some
other type of transportation—boat, train, car, etc.), a U.S. citizen has
traveled in foreign commerce and, therefore, all subsequent conduct,
Cummings).
259. Bianchi is “an extremely disturbing case involving a defendant who repeatedly
traveled around the world to meet and engage in sexual conduct with young boys.” United
States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 157 (3rd Cir. 2010).
260. Id. at 161–62.
261. Id. at 162 (citations omitted).
262. Bianchi is an unpublished opinion; however, since it is a 2010 case, it may be relied
on and cited. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (providing that: “A court may not prohibit or restrict
the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that
have been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished’, ‘not for publication’, ‘nonprecedential’, ‘not
precedent’, or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”).
263. United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted),.
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even noncommercial in nature, would be subject to federal regulation
under the Foreign Commerce Clause. As Judge Ferguson observed in
his dissent in Clark, “On some level, every act by a U.S. citizen abroad
takes place subsequent to an international flight or some form of ‘travel[
] in foreign commerce.’”264 This implication is sweeping and plainly
ignores the principle of limited federal government.265 Indeed, many
scholars have critiqued the tenable nexus test as having no apparent
limits.266 While the Ninth Circuit is correct that applying the Lopez
framework to the Foreign Commerce Clause cases is like “jamming a
square peg into a round hole,”267 any new test needs to set forth some
limiting factors. The next section of this article attempts to do just
that—articulate a new Foreign Commerce Clause legal framework that
embraces historical origins and stays true to precedent, but also creates
some practical limits. However, before setting forth this new legal
framework, it is important to critique Third and Fifth Circuit cases
which have rejected adopting any new test and, instead, have applied
the Lopez framework despite acknowledging that Congress’s power
under the Foreign Commerce Clause is broader than under the Interstate
Commerce Clause.
Approach #3: Applying the Lopez Framework but recognizing
Congress has broader power to regulate foreign commerce
In a third group of cases, courts have explicitly recognized the
distinctness of the Foreign Commerce Clause—namely, that it
encompasses power broader than Congress’s Interstate Commerce
Clause power because of the lack of federalism and state sovereignty
concerns. These courts, however, still decided to apply the Lopez
framework. This approach has more merit than approach one
(mechanically applying Lopez) because in these cases the court has at
least acknowledged the distinct historical and precedential path of the
Foreign Commerce Clause. This approach has also created the clearest
expression of the circuit split concerning how to analyze Congress’s
Foreign Commerce Clause power to regulate U.S. citizens’ conduct
abroad.268
264. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining, as
a “first principle[],” that “the Framers devised a federal government of limited and enumerated
powers”).
266. See, e.g., Bolia, supra note 46, at 797; Buffington, supra note 46, at 841; Christensen,
supra note 46, at 621; High, Jr., supra note 46, at 343; Hogan, supra note 46, at 641; Messigian,
supra note 46, at 1241; Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Holds That Congress Can Regulate Sex
Crimes Committed by U.S. Citizens Abroad—United States v. Clark, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2612
(2006).
267. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103.
268. See Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306–08.
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In a recent case, United States v. Pendleton, the Third Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of the noncommercial prong of the PROTECT Act
under the Foreign Commerce Clause by applying the Lopez legal
frame.269 In Pendleton, the defendant, who sexually molested a young
boy in Germany, challenged his conviction under the non-commercial
prong of the PROTECT Act as an invalid exercise of congressional
foreign commerce power. 270 Although the Third Circuit rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s new “tenable nexus” approach, 271 the Third Circuit
conceded that the Supreme Court never expressly applied the Interstate
Commerce Clause legal framework to the Foreign Commerce Clause:
“The three-category framework outlined in Lopez and Morrison applies,
on its face, to statutes enacted pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court has yet to determine whether this
framework applies to cases involving Congress’s power to regulate
pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause.”272 The court also conceded
that the test for the Foreign Commerce Clause had “its own distinct
evolutionary path,” 273 but noted that it was “used primarily [in the
dormant Formant Commerce Clause context] as a tool to limit the
ability of the several states to intervene in matters affecting international
trade.”274
Although the Third Circuit recognized that the scope of the foreign
commerce power was distinct from and greater than the interstate
commerce power, the court was hesitant to create a new test without
clearer guidance from the Supreme Court.275 Instead, the Third Circuit
found that the noncommercial prong of the PROTECT Act was
constitutional under the narrower Lopez standard, specifically the
channels of commerce category,276 and therefore it was not necessary to
address the broad interpretation of the Foreign Commerce Clause.277 In
269. Id.at 308.
270. Id. at 302.
271. Id. at 307–08.
272. Id. at 306.
273. Id. at 306 (citing United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006)).
274. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306. The Third Circuit explained: “Although jurisprudence on
the so-called ‘dormant’ Foreign Commerce Clause is well-developed, ‘[c]ases involving the
reach of . . . congressional authority to regulate our citizens’ conduct abroad are few and far
between.’” Id. at 307 (citing United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006).
275. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 308 (“Although we agree with Clark that the Interstate
Commerce Clause developed to address ‘unique federalism concerns’ that are absent in the
foreign commerce context, we are hesitant to dispose of Lopez’s ‘time-tested’ framework
without further guidance from the Supreme Court.”) (citation omitted).
276. Id. The Third Circuit observed: “Unlike Congressional authority to regulate activities
affecting interstate commerce under the third category in Lopez, Congress’s authority to regulate
the channels of commerce is not confined to regulations with an economic purpose or impact.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
277. Id. (“[W]e need not reach the fundamental question of whether the Supreme Court
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finding the PROTECT Act to be a valid exercise of the foreign
commerce power, the Third Circuit also noted as important that the
statute had an “express” jurisdictional statement that tied it to
“Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause.”278 Thus,
Pendelton is another example showing the importance of a statute
explicitly setting forth a jurisdictional hook to a commerce clause
power.279
By rejecting Clark’s new “tenable nexus” test, not only did
Pendleton create a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit, but it also created
confusion within the Third Circuit itself. The year before Pendleton, in
Bianchi, the Third Circuit contradictorily applied a “plain showing” test
to find the non-commercial prong of the PROTECT Act constitutional
under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 280 The Pendleton court made no
effort to address the reasons for two different tests or even to cite to
Bianchi. Such imprecision again illustrates the courts’ confusion
concerning the foreign commerce power over U.S. citizens’ conduct
abroad.
Like the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Bredimus recognized that
Congress’s foreign commerce power is broader than its Interstate
Commerce Clause power, but still opted to apply the Lopez framework
to a Foreign Commerce Clause issue. 281 Specifically, in Bredimus the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction under the PROTECT Act because
the defendant traveled in foreign commerce “for the purpose of
‘engaging in illicit sexual conduct’”282 (e.g., taking photos of young
Thai children “engaged in sexually explicit conduct”283). In upholding
the statute, the Bredimus court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has long
held that Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce is even
broader than its authority to regulate interstate commerce. . . . [A] court
should allow Congress greater deference in regulating the channels of
foreign commerce.”284 Despite this recognition of broad Foreign
Commerce Clause power, the Fifth Circuit applied the Interstate
Commerce Clause test—in particular the channels of commerce
category—to find the PROTECT Act constitutional.285 Thus, both the
will adopt the Ninth Circuit’s broad articulation of the Foreign Commerce Clause because, as
we shall explain, § 2423(c) [the PROTECT Act] is a valid congressional enactment under the
narrower standard articulated in Lopez.”).
278. Id. at 311 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000)).
279. See supra Section II.A.
280. United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 162 (3rd Cir. 2010). See also supra notes
260–63 and accompanying text (explaining Bianchi).
281. United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204–08 (5th Cir. 2003).
282. Id. at 204.
283. Id. at 202.
284. Id. at 208 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
285. Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205–06.
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Third and Fifth Circuits have recognized the differences underlying the
Foreign Commerce Clause, but, instead of adopting a new test like the
Ninth Circuit did in Clark, the Third and Fifth Circuits have applied the
Lopez legal framework. At least two district courts have adopted this
same approach.286
In sum, the Court has addressed certain aspects of the Foreign
Commerce Clause. The Court has developed a one voice test for the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and has referred to Congress’s
broad power to enact federal legislation concerning trade with foreign
nations. While these two tests are distinct from the Interstate Commerce
Clause framework, when a federal statute with extraterritorial reach has
been challenged these same courts oddly applied the Interstate
Commerce Clause framework to the Foreign Commerce Clause. Other
courts created a new “tenable nexus” test. Indeed, the courts are all over
the board, even contradicting themselves within their own circuits.287
None of the courts, however, have applied a legal framework that makes
sense. The Lopez three-category framework does not work because it
embodies state sovereignty concerns—unique concerns that are
irrelevant to the Foreign Commerce Clause.288 Moreover, the new
“tenable nexus” has no apparent limits.
Thus, the current legal landscape of the Foreign Commerce Clause is
in disarray. There is a plenary power test applied to laws that regulate
trade with foreign nations, and nothing but confusion as to what test
applies to laws with extraterritorial application. This article proposes
that there should be one workable legal framework applicable in both
situations. The remainder of this article considers what that legal
framework should be.

286. See United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 802–08 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
(applying the Raich analysis to conclude that a U.S. citizen who engaged in noncommercial sex
acts with children abroad could be prosecuted under the PROTECT Act without violating the
Foreign Commerce Clause) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9–22 (2005)). For an analysis
of Raich, see supra notes 119–25 and accompany text. See also United States v. Flath, 845 F.
Supp. 2d 951, 955 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (applying the “Lopez factors” to a Foreign Commerce
Clause challenge with the distinctions that “Congress has broader power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations than among states” and “the interplay of federalism and state sovereignty,
so prevalent in the interstate commerce context, is absent in the foreign commerce arena”).
287. In the Third Circuit, the court applies a different test in Pendleton than it does in
Bianchi. In the Ninth Circuit, the court applies a different test in Cummings than it does in
Clark. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text.
288. This conclusion is where Colangelo and I disagree. See supra note 49 (discussing
differences between this Article’s and Colangelo’s approach, the latter of which assumes that
the Interstate Commerce Clause framework should be imposed onto the Foreign Commerce
Clause).
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C. Option #3: The Indian Commerce Clause Legal
Framework—Too Unique
While a majority of courts have been willing to superimpose the
legal framework of the Interstate Commerce Clause onto the Foreign
Commerce Clause,289 no court has entertained the notion that the Indian
Commerce Clause legal framework should be applied to the Foreign
Commerce Clause. This dichotomy—analyzing the Foreign Commerce
Clause using the Interstate Commerce Clause framework, but not the
Indian Commerce Clause framework—is particularly interesting since,
as a matter of pure text, the Indian and Foreign Commerce Clauses
share more of the same language (for example, Congress can regulate
commerce “with foreign Nations” and “with the Indian Tribes” as
opposed to “among the several States”).290 So why not use the Indian
Commerce Clause legal framework?
To answer this question, this Section first briefly summarizes the
history and the legal landscape of the Indian Commerce Clause. Many
thoughtful scholars debate whether the current legal test is correct.291
Again, that debate is beyond the scope of this Article. The only reason
this Article explores the development of the Indian Commerce Clause
legal framework is to scrutinize whether it makes sense to apply that
framework to the Foreign Commerce Clause. As this section concludes,
because Congress’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause reflects
the unique relationship between the federal government and the Indian
tribes (much as the Interstate Commerce Clause reflects the unique
relationship between the federal government and the states), it does not
make sense to use that same framework in the foreign commerce
context.
1. History
Prior to the Constitutional Convention, there was “chaos in the
management of Indian affairs.”292 Some states were unilaterally
289. See supra Subsection II.B.2 (discussing the current legal landscape of the Foreign
Commerce Clause).
290. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). See infra Section III.C further
exploring this textual difference.
291. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce
Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007) (rejecting that the Indian Commerce Clause gives
Congress plenary power); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1069, 1069 (2004) (arguing that “the federal government’s power over individual Indian tribes
varies from tribe to tribe”); Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for
Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 170 (2002) (rejecting Congress’s plenary power over
Indian Tribes); Nathan Speed, Note, Examining the Interstate Commerce Clause Through the
Lens of the Indian Commerce Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 467, 470–71 (2007) (arguing for a narrow
interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause).
292. Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055,
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engaging in hostilities with Indian tribes, and others protested that
certain national treaties with Indian tribes constituted an “incursion on
state sovereignty.”293 Going into the Constitutional Convention, there
was agreement among the Founders that the “control of Indian affairs”
needed to be vested in a centralized national government.294 Madison
originally drafted a clause that allowed Congress to “regulate affairs
with the Indians.”295 This clause was later added to the existing
Commerce Clause and re-stylized by replacing the word “affairs” with
“commerce.”296 No record of debate accompanies the textual change.297
After doing an in-depth historical analysis of the Indian Commerce
Clause, one scholar concluded that the intent of the Framers was clear—
the “national government [should have] full and complete power to
manage all affairs and trade with the Indian tribes,” and “the
sovereignty of the Indian tribes as peoples [was] separate from the states
[as] evident in their enumeration among the states and foreign nations in
the Commerce Clause.”298 History, therefore, shows that the Framers
viewed the Indian tribes as separate entities with distinct concerns.
Thus, although in the final version of the Commerce Clause “[t]o
regulate Commerce” is shared among all three groups (states, foreign
nations, and Indian tribes),299 the Framers saw the Indian tribes as a
distinct group having a unique relationship with the federal government.
2. Current Legal Landscape
Precedent reflects this historical development. In determining the
broad scope of the Indian Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has
consistently considered the distinct relationship between Congress and
the Indian tribes. In 1831, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court
explained that Indian tribes are akin to foreign nations because they are
sovereign, but unique because they are physically located in the United
States.300 Thus, early on the Court recognized Indian tribes as a separate
1147 (1995).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 321, 324 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966).
296. Id. at 143, 493.
297. Clinton, supra note 293, at 1157 (“While the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause
and the intent of the framers seems reasonably clear, it is remarkable that the clause provoked so
little debate or overt attention at the Constitutional Convention.”).
298. Id. at 1164.
299. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
300. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an
unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, . . . yet it may well
be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.”).
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classification from foreign nations. The Court labeled the Indian tribes
as “domestic dependent nations” and determined that “[t]hier relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”301
United States v. Kagama302 signified a major application of this
“ward” theory.303 In Kagama, the Court considered the constitutionality
of the Major Crimes Act of 1885,304 a statute that allowed for the
federal prosecution of Native Americans who committed certain crimes
on Indian Territory. The Court rejected the government’s argument that
the Act was constitutional under the Indian Commerce Clause, finding
this argument “a very strained construction” of the Constitution.305
Instead, the Court looked outside the Constitution and found the Act
valid under the “wards of the nation” theory focusing on the relationship
between the Indian tribes and the federal government.306
Later, however, the Court brought such issues back to the
Constitution and explicitly stated that Congress’s plenary power over
the Indian tribes arose from the Indian Commerce Clause—sometimes
in conjunction with the Treaty Clause,307 and other times on its own.308
As recently as 2004, in United States v. Lara, the Court explained that
301. Id.
302. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
303. Id. at 383–84.
304. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). Under this Act, Native Americans can be prosecuted for such crimes as
murder, kidnapping, incest, felony child abuse, burglary, and robbery that take place wholly on
an Indian Reservation against another Native American or non-Native American. Id. § 1153(a).
305. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378.
306. The Court described this unique relationship as follows:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of
the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive, and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the
question has arisen.
Id. at 383–84 (emphasis in original).
307. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”); see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) (“The source of federal authority over Indian
matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the
power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for
treaty making.”).
308. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (explaining that
the “central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power
to legislate in the field of Indian affairs”).
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“the Constitution grants Congress broad general powers . . . described
as ‘plenary and exclusive,’” a source of which the “Court has
traditionally identified [in] the Indian Commerce Clause.”309 In
describing the Indian Commerce Clause framework in this way, the
Court again pointed out that the Indian tribes, as “dependent
sovereign[s] that [are] not [] State[s],” have a distinct and unique history
with the federal government.310 Simply put, when analyzing the
constitutionality of federal regulation of Indian tribes, the Court has
developed “canons of construction applicable in Indian law [that] are
rooted in the unique trust relationship between the Unites States and the
Indians.”311
3. Legal Framework Inapplicable to the Foreign Commerce Clause
History and precedent show that Congress’s plenary power over
Indian tribes stems from its special relationship with them. Given that
the Indian Commerce Clause test reflects the unique “dependent
sovereign”312 relationship the Indian tribes have with the federal
government, it does not make sense to superimpose this framework onto
the Foreign Commerce Clause. Indeed, the early Court flat-out rejected
analogizing Indian tribes to foreign nations.313 For example, the Court
has upheld Congress’s right to regulate conduct of Native Americans
inside Indian Territory.314 Foreign national sovereignty concerns,
however, would prevent Congress from regulating the conduct of a
Cuban inside Cuba.315 Moreover, in discussing the scope of the Indian
Commerce Clause, the Court has not relied on or analyzed the Foreign
Commerce Clause.316 Thus, the Indian Commerce Clause legal
309. 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
310. Id. at 203.
311. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
312. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200, 202–03.
313. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (explaining that Indian
tribes should not be “denominated [as] foreign nations”).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (allowing Native
Americans to be federally prosecuted for committing certain crimes against another Native
Americans in Indian Territory).
315. See infra Part III.B (discussing foreign national sovereignty issues).
316. When the Court mentions foreign nations, it does so only to highlight the difference
with Indian tribes. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. In 1876, however, the early
Court, in dicta, suggested that the Indian Commerce Clause power was as broad as the Foreign
Commerce Clause power: “Congress now has the exclusive and absolute power to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes,—a power as broad and free from restrictions as that to regulate
commerce with foreign nations.” United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194
(1876) (upholding a federal law prohibiting the sale of alcohol in Indian Territory). Importantly,
in this one passing reference, the Court did not explore the depth of the foreign commerce
power, and, as reflected by current jurisprudence, the Court continues to struggle with the depth
of the Indian commerce power.
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framework should not be, and has not been, superimposed onto the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
4. Relevant Themes
While it does not make sense to apply the Indian Commerce Clause
structure in the foreign commerce context, two important inferences
emerge. First, the historical development and legal analysis of the
Indian Commerce Clause is perhaps the strongest evidence that there
are three distinct commerce clauses. As the Court succinctly put it:
The objects, to which the power of regulating commerce
might be directed, are divided into three distinct classes—
foreign nations, the several states, and Indian Tribes. When
forming this article, the convention considered them as
entirely distinct.” In fact, the language of the Clause no
more admits of treating Indian tribes as States than of
treating foreign nations as States.317
The distinct development of the legal framework for the Indian and
Interstate Commerce Clauses illustrates that the tests for each group
(states, Indian tribes, and foreign nations) should be different from each
other.
Second, when considering how to articulate the test for each
commerce clause, it is important to consider the relationship each group
has with the federal government. The Court has specifically recognized
the “very different applications” of the Interstate and Indian Commerce
Clauses, commenting that the power to regulate interstate commerce “is
premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the States
in our constitutional system that is not readily imported to cases
involving the Indian Commerce Clause.”318 Likewise, the Court has
observed that “[t]he principle of duality in our system of government
does not touch the authority of the Congress in the regulation of foreign
commerce.”319 Thus, while the Interstate, Indian, and Foreign
Commerce Clauses are in parallel phrases in the Constitution, history
and precedent justify a different reading of each clause based upon the
type of relationship with the federal government.
In sum, the Indian Commerce Clause legal framework has developed
from the unique relationship between the Indian tribes and the federal
government. This likely explains why lower courts, when confronted
with the reach of Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power to
317. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (citing Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18).
318. Id. at 192 (1989).
319. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57 (1933).
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regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens abroad, have not imposed the
framework of the Indian Commerce Clause onto the Foreign Commerce
Clause. That, of course, begs the question as to why these same courts
apply the Interstate Commerce Clause structure when analyzing
Congress’s foreign commerce power;320 they do so without any
recognition as to the unique relationship the federal government has
with states. Such concerns are absent in the relationship that the federal
government has with foreign nations. Thus, although the legal
framework of the Foreign Commerce Clause is in disarray, neither the
legal framework of the Interstate or Indian Commerce Clauses work for
the Foreign Commerce Clause. The remainder of this Article, therefore,
contemplates what factors courts and Congress might consider when
confronted with the scope of Congress’s foreign commerce power,
particularly when confronted with challenges to federal laws that have
extraterritorial application.
III. FACTORS TO CONSIDER FOR THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
How far does Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause reach? Should Congress’s foreign commerce power321 allow it to
pass extraterritorial laws that prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in
conduct while traveling abroad, when that conduct is legal in the foreign
country? Does the mere act of buying a plane ticket mean that a U.S.
citizen has entered the channels of foreign commerce and thus every
subsequent action abroad is subject to regulation by Congress under the
Foreign Commerce Clause? As discussed above, lower courts are split
on how to answer these questions. The majority of courts simply apply
the legal framework of the Interstate Commerce Clause, which fails to
acknowledge the unique relationship the federal government has with
foreign nations.322 Other lower courts have created a new “tenable
nexus” test with no apparent limits.323 The purpose of this Section is to
lay out some factors that courts should consider when determining the
scope of Congress’s foreign commerce power.
This Article does not attempt to use any particular constitutional
interpretive
methodology;
controversies
concerning
such
324
methodologies are beyond the scope of this Article. The goal of this
320. See supra Parts II.A–B.
321. There might be other sources of the Constitution which may allow Congress to enact
such laws. See, e.g., supra Part I.B (discussing different Constitutional sources for federal laws
with extraterritorial application). Such a discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
322. See supra Part II.B.
323. Id.
324. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
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Article is more modest. This Article considers history, precedent
(domestic and international), structure, and text in order to begin a
conversation325 concerning the scope of the Foreign Commerce
Clause.326
A. First Principles: Broad Power in Light of a Limited Government
Given the history and jurisprudence of the Foreign Commerce
Clause, an argument might be made that Congress’s power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause is virtually limitless. When trade with other
nations is at issue, the Court, relying on the “one voice” test, has
historically treated Congress’s foreign commerce power as broader than
the interstate commerce power.327 That raises many interesting issues
concerning the scope of Congress’s foreign commerce power. For
example, under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress has enacted
over three thousand criminal laws and massive educational
regulations.328 Given that Congress has broader power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause, what are the limits? Could Congress enact
criminal laws under the Foreign Commerce Clause that regulate all
criminal activities by U.S. citizens in foreign nations?
A framework that recognizes no limits on the Foreign Commerce
Clause is problematic. It violates the notion that the Constitution is
structured to limit Congress’s power. When confronted with Commerce
Clause issues, courts often “start with first principles.”329 The first of
§ 1.4 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the debate of constitutional interpretive theories); RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 16–17 (2004) (same).
325. See supra Part I.A (discussing international law); supra Part II.B (discussing the
history and precedent of the Foreign Commerce Clause); infra Part III.C (discussing textual
considerations).
326. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 39, at 975 (“And, as a matter of practice, ‘[m]ore
often than not, the Court relies on a variety of interpretive techniques in reaching its decision[,
including] . . . text, original understanding, structure, precedent, and doctrine in order to reach a
particular result. As such, the holding is essentially a result of the sum of these parts.’ ”)
(brackets in original) (citing LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION xviii–xix (2009)); see also J. Andrew Kent,
Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of
Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 858–60 (2007) (describing consensus among different interpretive
methods).
327. See supra Part II.B.2.
328. See Robert J. Pushaw, Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to Prohibit
Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 332 (2005) (citing to TASK FORCE ON
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION A.B.A., THE FEDERALIZATION
OF CRIMINAL LAW 2, 5–14 (1998); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1–9413 (2000)).
329. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir.
2002).
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these “first principles” is that the Founders meant for the Constitution to
“ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.”330 The Constitution
therefore states explicitly that Congress is vested with “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted.”331 By implication, then, there are powers not
granted to Congress in the Constitution, which means that the federal
government “possesses only limited powers; the States and the people
retain the remainder.”332 Importantly, “the people” retain civil
liberties.333
As such, while the Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,”334 there are
implied limits to this enumerated power.335 As Chief Justice Roberts
recently put it, the Constitution does not grant “general authority to
perform all the conceivable functions.”336 Anything different “is not the
country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned.”337 One scholar has
concluded that “foreign affairs activities are [not] exempt from this
proposition.”338 Lower courts have thus correctly recognized limits to
the foreign commerce power when analyzing the constitutionality of
laws with extraterritorial application.339 Therefore, while the scope of
330. Ho, 311 F.3d at 596.
331. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
332. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
333. In a case involving Congress’s delegation of power to the President over foreign
affairs, the Court has suggested that the notion of “enumerated powers[] is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 316 (1936). Curtiss-Wright, however, did not concern the Foreign Commerce Clause. See
id. at 312–16. Thus, this reference “does not establish that the Foreign Commerce Clause has no
meaning or is without bounds.” United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1109 n. 14 (9th Cir.
2006). Furthermore, this reference in Curtiss-Wright addresses the notion that states lack foreign
affairs power; it does not concern congressional power to enact laws with extraterritorial
application that impact the liberties of U.S. citizens. Indeed, courts have criticized CurtissWright’s proposition in such circumstances. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316; United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602–03 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that the “ramifications of
Curtiss-Wright, however, remain somewhat enigmatic,” but also noting that it is clear that the
executive branch “cannot ignore the admonitions of the Fourth Amendment when investigating
criminal activity unrelated to foreign affairs”).
334. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
335. As discussed in Section I.A, this notion is reflected in the Interstate Commerce Clause
jurisprudence which recognizes that, even though the commerce power is broad, there is some
limit. See supra Section II.A.4. (discussing relevant themes in Interstate Commerce Clause cases
that might influence the legal framework of the Foreign Commerce Clause).
336. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
337. Id.
338. Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323,
335 (2001).
339. See supra Part II.B.2.b. Moreover, when considering the test for the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly recognized some limits as well. See supra
Part II.B.2.a (discussing limits to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause as articulated in
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983)).
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the Foreign Commerce Clause is undoubtedly broad, as a matter of first
principles, the legal framework should create some limits. What are
those limits?340 As discussed in the next sections, history, jurisprudence,
and textual considerations provide some guidance in answering this
question.
B. History and Jurisprudence: Distinct Framework
Another common and relevant theme that emerges from the history
and jurisprudence of the Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses is that
the legal framework of each clause reflects the distinct type of
relationship that the group shares with the federal government. For the
Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court has created the Lopez threecategory framework reflecting state sovereignty concerns.341 For the
Indian Commerce Clause, the Court has allowed Congress to have
broad power reflecting the unique status of Indian tribes as “dependent
sovereigns.”342 By analogy, the legal framework of the Foreign
Commerce Clause should reflect the type of relationship that foreign
nations have with the federal government.
What type of a relationship does a foreign nation have with
Congress? The short answer is: one in which the United States can
speak with one voice,343 while also cognizant of foreign sovereignty
matters. While the meaning of the term foreign sovereignty is in flux,344
340. While this Article suggests a legal framework that provides some limits on the foreign
commerce power, it is interesting to think about a limitless power. If Congress did have limitless
plenary power to regulate all U.S. citizens’ conduct abroad, it might be argued that the Bill of
Rights would provide the only constraint. For example, one might argue that under an
inexhaustible foreign commerce power, Congress could enact laws prohibiting a U.S. citizen
from littering in France, but Congress would not be allowed to prohibit a U.S. citizen from
engaging in a protest in China if it violated that citizen’s free speech rights. A major problem,
however, is that it is not always clear when, and if, the Bill of Rights protects a U.S. citizen who
engages in conduct abroad. See, e.g., United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 510 (11th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is generally inapplicable to actions carried out by
foreign officials in their own countries enforcing their own laws, even if American officials are
present and cooperate in some degree”). Thus, advocating for a limitless foreign commerce
power might simply give Congress complete unbridled power—a government not envisioned by
the Founders or supported by the notion of separation of powers or a limited federal
government.
341. See supra Part II.A.
342. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 203 (2004); see also supra Part II.C.
343. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979); see also supra
Part II.B (discussing the one voice test).
344. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 (1990). As Professor Reisman explains:
“International law is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but, in its modern sense,
the object of protection is not the power base of the tyrant . . . but the continuing capacity of a
population freely to express and effect choices about the identities and policies of its
governors.” Id. Thus, for example, “[t]he Chinese Government’s massacre in Tiananmen Square
to maintain an oligarchy against the wishes of the people was a violation of Chinese
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it at least reflects the notion that one country cannot legislate for another
without consent. As the Court noted nearly two hundred years ago, “The
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute.”345 As another court recently noted, “Unlike the states,
foreign nations have never submitted to the sovereignty of the United
States government nor ceded their regulatory powers to the United
States.”346 Therefore, by way of example, a U.S. federal law prohibiting
a Cuban from smoking Cuban cigars inside Cuba (or inside any country
other than the U.S.) would be unenforceable. This concern for foreign
sovereignty “is [now principally] a matter of grace and comity on the
part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the
Constitution[,]”347 which makes it a matter related more to the foreign
affairs doctrine than to constitutional scrutiny.348
Professor Colangelo, however, rightly concludes that because of
foreign sovereignty concerns, the Foreign Commerce Clause “does not
establish federal supremacy over the power of foreign nations.”349
Absent some treaty to the contrary, Colangelo explains, “foreign nations
never surrendered their sovereignty to the federal government.”350 On
the other hand, both Indian tribes and the states have done so. Thus,
unlike Indian tribes and states, Congress “has no delegated power . . . to
prescribe general rules for international commerce among and inside the
nations of the world.”351 Colangelo is correct that the legal framework
of the Foreign Commerce Clause should manifest respect for these
unique foreign sovereignty concerns.352
sovereignty.” Id.
345. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
346. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 907 n.24 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d, 924 F.2d
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
347. Verlinden B.V. v. Ctr. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
348. Id. (“Accordingly, this Court consistently has deferred to the decisions of the political
branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over
actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.”); see also, e.g., the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. (2006) (providing generally that foreign
nations are immune from being sued in the United States unless one of its many exceptions
apply).
349. Colangelo, supra note 40, at 1021.
350. Id. at 980.
351. Id. at 1021–22 (emphasis added).
352. In this regard, Colangelo is correct; because Congress cannot regulate non-U.S.
citizens’ conduct in other countries, Congress’s foreign commerce clause power is “in some
respects weaker than its powers to regulate domestically.” Id. at 954. For example, as explained
in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (2005), under the Interstate Commerce Clause a U.S.
citizen in California consuming homegrown marijuana (complete intrastate activity) is subject to
federal regulation; but, a “Dutchman enjoying his homegrown marijuana in the Netherlands
need not be worried” about U.S. federal regulation. Colangelo, supra note 39, at 1022. Although
Colangelo recognizes this difference between Congress’s interstate and foreign commerce
power, he superimposes the legal framework of the Interstate Commerce Clause onto the
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Colangelo’s treatment of the Foreign Commerce Clause, however,
misses an important point. When a U.S. citizen engages in activity
involving commerce in a foreign county, the United States, by extension
of its citizenship, also engages in commerce with a foreign nation.
Under international law’s jurisdictional nationality principle, it is wellestablished that Congress can regulate the conduct of a U.S. citizen who
travels in another foreign territory without infringing upon the other
nation’s sovereignty;353 and, indeed, there are numerous federal laws
with such extraterritorial application.354
In sum, there are two principles underlying the Foreign Commerce
Clause. A Foreign Commerce Clause legal framework should empower
the United States to speak with one voice in foreign matters and, at the
same time, respect the sovereignty of foreign nations. Moreover, the
legal framework permits Congress to regulate the conduct of U.S.
citizens in foreign countries. But, given that the federal government has
limited power, there must be some limit to the scope of that power. The
tricky question is how to establish a framework that reflects these two
principles. The text of the Foreign Commerce Clause gives some
guidance.
C. Textual Considerations
While each of the three groups—states, foreign nations, and Indian
tribes—each have a unique relationship with the federal government,355
they are all preceded by the same phrase “to regulate commerce.”356 As
a matter of syntax, it seems logical to ascribe the same meaning of the
phrase across the clauses. Chief Justice Marshall explained:
“[C]ommerce, as the word is used in the constitution, is a unit . . . . [I]n
its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning
throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain
intelligible cause which alters it.”357 Leading scholars concur that there
is “the presumption of intrasentence uniformity” that the phase “to
regulate commerce” has the same meaning whether among states, with
foreign nations, or with Indian tribes.358
While the phrase, “to regulate commerce” should be uniformly
applied, it does not mean that the regulations have to be the same with
each distinct group. Consider this sentence as an example: “A
Foreign Commerce Clause—a major point where Colangelo’s approach and this Article diverge.
353. See supra Part I.A (discussing the nationality principle under international law).
354. See infra Appendix A.
355. See supra Part II.
356. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
357. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
358. Prakash, supra note 46, at 1150; see also Balkin supra note 52, at 15; Vermeule,
supra note 51, at 1178 (agreeing “with Prakash’s presumption of intrasentence uniformity,” but
disagreeing this means there is only one commerce clause).
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corporation can regulate the interactions between its employees, with its
subsidiaries, and with other companies.” The sentence insinuates one
action (regulating interactions), but with three different categories of
regulations. Regulations governing the employees (like requiring
employees to take sexual harassment training) would be different than
those governing subsidiaries, which would be different than those
governing relationships with other companies (where one corporation
could not require another company’s employees to take sexual
harassment training). Likewise, while “the power to regulate commerce
is conferred by the same words of the commerce clause with respect
both to foreign commerce and interstate commerce,” that “power when
exercised in respect of foreign commerce may be broader than when
exercised as to interstate commerce.”359 As one scholar aptly explained,
“[T]he same set of words might have different effects in combination
with different words in the same sentence, so that to ‘regulate
commerce with’ might not mean the same thing as to ‘regulate
commerce among.’ ”360 To unravel these textual issues, this section of
the Article reviews the current debate of the meaning of first “to
regulate commerce” and then “with foreign Nations.”
1. “to regulate Commerce”
The phrase “to regulate” did not significantly garner the attention of
the Court until Sebelius, the recent Obamacare case. Writing for the
majority of a divided Court, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[t]he
Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel
it.”361 “[T]o regulate commerce presupposes the existence of
commercial activity to be regulated.”362 Based on this definition,
Roberts concluded that the provision mandating individuals to procure
insurance was unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause
because Congress did not have the power to “compel individuals not
engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”363 Justice
Ginsburg and three other Justices, however, concluded that the original
359. See, e.g., Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433–34 (1932)
(explaining by way of example that “[i]n the regulation of foreign commerce an embargo is
admissible; but it reasonably cannot be thought that, in respect of legitimate and unobjectionable
articles, an embargo would be admissible as a regulation of interstate commerce”).
360. Balkin, supra note 52, at 14 (emphasis in original).
361. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (explaining that to
ignore the distinction between regulating and compelling commerce would undermine the
principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited and enumerated powers).
362. Id. at 2586.
363. Id. Roberts explained: “Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to
regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially
vast domain to congressional authority.” Id. at 2587. Roberts, however, found the individual
mandate to be constitutional under the Taxing Clause. Id. at 2593–600.
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meaning of “to regulate” meant “to require action.”364 and thus found
that the individual mandate was constitutional under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Prior to Sebelius, most scholars agreed that the
phrase “to regulate” meant “prescribing rules for.”365
“[L]ike many constitutional terms, the meaning of ‘commerce’ is
neither obvious nor uncontested.”366 Instead of explicitly defining the
term “commerce,” the Court tends to rely on its intuition that an activity
is or is not “commercial” or “economic” in nature.367 The meaning of
“commerce” has been debated by many renowned scholars. As a matter
of quick summary, there are generally three views. One view interprets
the original meaning of commerce narrowly to include only trade
activity.368 The second view (broad with some limits) understands
“‘commerce’ as including only commercial interactions—voluntary
sales of products and services and related activities intended for the
marketplace, such as the manufacturing of goods for sale, banking,
transportation for a fee, and paid labor.”369 The third view broadly
interprets the meaning of commerce to be “intercourse” which includes
both economic and social interactions.370
The purpose of this Article is not to contribute to the debate over the
meaning of “to regulate Commerce.” Rather, this Article, simply takes
the position that however the Court defines “to regulate Commerce,” the
Court should use the same definition consistently among all three
364. Id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
365. Pushaw, Obamacare, supra note 52, at 1708 (citing Balkin, supra note 52, at 19);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 708 (2002) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824)). But see Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 139–46 (2001) (arguing that, depending on the “subject of the
regulation,” “to regulate” may not encompass “prohibitions”).
366. United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 624 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing to Nelson &
Pushaw, First Principles, supra note 54, at 9–42, 107–10).
367. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Gender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to
decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”); Pushaw,
Counter-Revolution, supra note 74, at 881 (explaining that in Lopez and Morrison “the Court
announced that Congress can regulate only ‘commercial’ or ‘economic’ activity . . . [but] the
majority refused to define these words”).
368. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 366, at 104 (arguing original intent of Commerce Clause
was to regulate only interstate trade and transportation of goods); Robert H. Bork & Daniel E.
Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 861–62 (2002).
369. Pushaw, Obamacare, supra note 52, at 1706 (citing Nelson & Pushaw, First
Principles, supra note 54, at 9–42).
370. See AMAR, supra note 52, at 107–08; Balkin, supra note 50, at 5–6, 15–29.
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categories.371 The real difference among the legal framework of three
clauses is reflected in the phrases that follow “to regulate commerce.”
Thus, as discussed next, it is imperative to consider what the phrase
“with foreign Nations” means.
2. “with foreign Nations”
a. Not “among” or “within”
Before analyzing what “with foreign Nations” might mean, it is
important to point out what it does not mean. First, the phrase is “with,”
not “among.”372 The word “among,” as in the Interstate Commerce
Clause (“among the several States”) embodies the notion of “activities
that ‘generate collective action problems that concern more than one
state.”373 Thus, as the Court has held, Congress can regulate commerce
among states (i.e., inter-state) or conduct wholly intrastate so long as it
substantially affects interstate commerce.374 If the Foreign Commerce
Clause used the language, “among the foreign Nations,” such power
would be unenforceable because it would suggest that Congress could
regulate conduct solely between foreign nations. For example, if the
phrasing were “among,” Congress could conceivably pass a law
requiring Mexico to enact an embargo of Cuban cigars. Without
Mexico’s consent (for example, a treaty), such congressional action
would create foreign sovereignty problems.375
371. See Balkin, supra note 52, at 13 (explaining that “[w]hatever ‘regulate’ and
‘commerce’ refer to, there is a strong argument that they have the same semantic meaning with
the respect to all three,” including the “[s]tates, foreign nations, and Indian tribes”).
372. The Court has noted the differences in the meaning of “with” and “among” in Indian
Commerce Clause precedent, and, thus, likewise should recognize a difference where the
Foreign Commerce Clause is concerned. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490
U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he fact that States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the
same territory makes it inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the
context of commerce ‘among’ States with mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction to trade
‘with’ Indian tribes.”).
373. Balkin, Commerce, supra note 52, at 6); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 553 (1995) (“Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be restricted to
that commerce which concerns more States than one . . . .”) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824)).
374. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 52, at 30 (explaining “Congress can regulate
interactions that extend in their operation beyond the bounds of a particular state, and
interactions that extend in their effects beyond the bounds of a particular state”); see also supra
Part II.A. (describing the current legal framework of the Interstate Commerce Clause, including
the substantial effects test and the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact
comprehensive regulatory schemes that may impact wholly intrastate activity as in Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)).
375. See supra Part III.B (discussing national sovereignty as an underlying principle of the
Foreign Commerce Clause); supra Part I.A (discussing the applicability of international law
jurisdictional principles to U.S. laws with extraterritorial application).
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Second, the phrase is “with,” not “within.” If the Foreign Commerce
Clause were phrased, “within foreign Nations,” foreign sovereignty
concerns would again arise because it would suggest Congress could
regulate non-U.S. citizens’ conduct within other nations. A U.S. law
that prohibits a Japanese citizen within Japan (or within any other
foreign nation) from smoking Cuban cigars would not be enforceable
because it would encroach on the other nation’s sovereignty and violate
international law jurisdictional principles.376 As the Court has
explained: “Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of
it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own
citizens.”377 Thus, the phraseology of the Foreign Commerce Clause
suggests that there are some limits to Congress’s power; namely that
Congress has no sovereignty jurisdiction over conduct either among
foreign nations, or within a foreign nation concerning the conduct of
non-U.S. citizens.378
b. “With” Defined as “means” or “connection”
What does the term “with” entail?379 Looking at dictionaries
contemporary to the Constitutional Convention, two notable definitions
emerge. “With” is defined as “noting the means” or “noting
connection.”380 The first definition, “means,” suggests that under the
Foreign Commerce Clause, Congress could enact laws that concern
travel by means of foreign commerce, such as traveling by plane. This
“means” concept potentially applies to § 2423(b) of the PROTECT Act,
376. See supra Part I.A.
377. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (emphasis added).
378. Colangelo concludes that the “difference between the words ‘among’ in the Interstate
Commerce Clause and ‘with’ in the Foreign Commerce Clause indicates that Congress has no
more, and in some respects may have less, power to regulate commerce inside foreign nations
under the Foreign Commerce Clause than inside the states under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.” Colangelo, supra note 39, at 972. In this limited way the Foreign Commerce Clause is
narrower than the Interstate Commerce Clause in that Congress cannot regulate inside a foreign
nation, but can regulate inside of a state. However, this analysis misses the main issue
confronting the courts because it does not recognize that Congress’s foreign commerce power is
broad (ever broader than under the Interstate Commerce Clause) when it comes to regulating
U.S. citizens’ conduct in other countries. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing circuit splits on this
issue).
379. As a matter of terminology, the word “with” also appears in the Indian Commerce
Clause (“with the Indian Tribes”). The significance of this shared term reflects that Indian tribes,
like foreign nations, have a type of relationship different than the states. Beyond this reflection,
given that Indian tribes are unique “dependent sovereigns,” the shared “with” cannot signify
anything more. See supra Part II.C. (discussing the uniqueness of the Indian Commerce Clause
as identified in such cases as United States v. Lara, 514 U.S. 193, 203 (2004)).
380. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768)
(unpaginated), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=bXsCAAAAQAAJ&pg=PP943#
v=onepage&q&f =false.
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which regulates the conduct of a U.S. citizen who enters foreign
commerce (like catching a plane) with the intent of molesting children
abroad.381 By forming the intent to molest before catching the plane, the
perpetrator intended to use the means of foreign commerce for immoral
uses (this is different than § 2423(c) of the PROTECT Act which
removes the intent requirement).382 Such an analysis is analogous to
Interstate Commerce Clause precedent that allows Congress to regulate
the immoral use of the channels or instrumentalities of commerce,383
which, as Justice Scalia has noted, is the very “ingredient” of
commerce.384
If the Foreign Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate the
“means” of foreign commerce, does that imply that Congress could
regulate all means of international travel, including travel by non-U.S.
citizens without any connection to the United States (such as an Italian
citizen flying on an Italian owned aircraft to Spain)? Such vast power
not only violates the notion that Congress’s foreign commerce power is
limited, but also encroaches on foreign sovereignty principles.385 This is
where the second definition, “connection,” becomes important.386
“Connection” signifies that whatever conduct Congress is attempting
to regulate under the Foreign Commerce Clause should link the foreign
nation and the United States. In thinking about what this link might
entail, one source to consider are those cases where courts have dealt
with statutory challenges to the application of laws with extraterritorial
reach. In these cases, courts have to determine, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, whether the jurisdictional scope of a federal statue
applies extraterritorially. Although these cases discuss “a canon of
construction . . . about a statute’s meaning, rather than a limit upon
Congress’s power to legislate [under the Foreign Commerce
381. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2006).
382. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006).
383. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320–26 (1913) (upholding, under the
Interstate Commerce Clause, the constitutional validity of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24,
a federal statute regulating interstate travel for the improper purposes of prostitution).
384. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
385. See supra Parts III.A and III.B.
386. This fear of unreasonable exercise of power is precisely why the Ninth Circuit’s
“tenable nexus” test is problematic. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th
Cir. 2006). In Clark, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that the Foreign Commerce Clause
should have a distinct test, separate from the Interstate Commerce Clause, but the test’s only
requirement is that the regulation has a “tenable nexus” to foreign commerce. Id.; see also supra
Part II.B (discussing the “tenable nexus” test). This nebulous standard could have unreasonable
results such as allowing Congress to regulate all airspace (even an Italian flying on an Italian
plane headed to Spain), since such travel has a tenable nexus to foreign commerce. See Clark,
435 F.3d at 1117–20 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). This is why the second factor, “connection” to
the United States, is so important. It puts reasonable limits on the foreign commerce power so
that Congress can only regulate commerce which has some link to the United States.
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Clause],”387 such cases are instructive because they give guidance on
what factors courts consider when confronted with laws that apply
abroad. Four factors emerge from these cases that help inform what a
“connection” to a foreign nation may entail. These four factors are:
(1) impact on the United States; (2) territorial nexus; (3) congressional
intent; and (4) respect for international norms. This proposed legal
framework of the Foreign Commerce Clause does not require that each
of these factors be present. Rather, courts should consider the totality of
circumstances in light of these four factors when trying to determine if a
federal law regulates commerce that has a “connection” between the
foreign nation and the United States. Each factor is discussed in turn
below.
First, courts have interpreted laws to have extraterritorial application
where the law regulates conduct that has some impact on the United
States. For example, in Steele v. Bulova Watch Company,388 the Court
interpreted the Lanham Act389 as having extraterritorial application to a
civil claim against a U.S. citizen who, while in Mexico, deceptively
used a U.S. company’s trademark.390 In finding that the language of the
statute allowed for extraterritorial application, the Court explained that
the defendant’s acts “were not confined within the territorial limits of a
foreign nation” but rather “reflect[ed] adversely” on an American
company’s “trade reputation in markets cultivated by advertising here as
well as abroad.”391 Thus, where a U.S. citizen’s conduct affects the
United States, courts have interpreted statutes to have extraterritorial
reach. The Court in dicta has used similar language when talking about
the foreign commerce power, explaining that Congress can make laws
with extraterritorial reach “where the United States interests are
affected.”392 Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, Congress therefore
should be limited to passing laws that regulate conduct abroad only if
that conduct somehow affects the United States. This factor makes
sense because it would prevent, for example, Congress from regulating
the conduct of an Italian traveling to Spain on an Italian airline because
it has no effect on the United States even though it involves a means of
foreign commerce.
387. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
388. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
389. 15 U.S.C § 1051 (2006).
390. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 286–89.
391. Id. at 286.
392. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813–14 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting on other grounds) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979) (explaining that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the “practices of an American citizen abroad” having an impact “on American
foreign commerce are subject to the Sherman Act”).
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Second, in these statutory interpretation cases, some type of
territorial nexus393 is often required because without it, courts are less
likely to find the extraterritorial reach of a law valid. For example, in
United States v. Weingarten, a U.S. citizen was convicted of violating
the PROTECT Act for traveling from Belgium to Israel where he
molested a child.394 The court found the conviction invalid, explaining
that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the phrase, “travel[] in
Foreign Commerce” in the PROTECT Act did “not criminalize travel
occurring wholly between two foreign countries and without any
territorial nexus to the United States.”395 Applying this same principle,
another district court found no extraterritorial jurisdiction of the federal
kidnapping law396 to a kidnapping that had no territorial link to the
United States, but took place on the high seas and in Cuba.397 In dicta, at
least one court has suggested this principle also limits power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause. In United States v. Yunis, where a foreign
defendant was charged with destruction of a foreign aircraft, 398 the
court in dicta explained that the foreign commerce power did not give
Congress the “authority to regulate global air commerce . . . which has
no connection to the United States.”399 A territorial nexus factor for a
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis makes sense because anything less
would subject “almost every aircraft,” or any means of foreign travel,
even “operating exclusively overseas,” to “regulation by the United
States.”400
393. “Territorial nexus” is different than the Ninth Circuit’s “tenable nexus” test. The
Ninth Circuit’s test requires that the regulated conduct simply has a nexus to foreign commerce,
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), hence the reason the dissent was
strongly opposed to the test. Id. at 1117–20 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Territorial nexus, on the
other hand, suggests that the conduct has to have some connection to the United States itself, not
just foreign commerce.
394. United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2011).
395. Id. at 70–71 (emphasis added).
396. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (prohibiting kidnapping in “foreign commerce”).
397. United States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that “the foreign
commerce jurisdictional basis [of the federal kidnapping statute] mandates that the kidnapping
take place in the United States and that the victim be subsequently transported to a foreign
State,” and, therefore, kidnapping that took place on high seas with subsequent transportation to
Cuba was not subject to foreign commerce jurisdiction); see also United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a
defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant
and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”)
(quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990)).
398. 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
399. Id. at 907 n.24 (emphasis added). It is important to note that Yunis did not directly
involve a Foreign Commerce Clause issue, but rather the statutory interpretation of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 18 U.S.C. § 31. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 907–08.
400. Id. at 908.
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The last two factors are encompassed in two presumptions that
courts use when determining whether a law, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, has extraterritorial reach. The first “presumption [is] that
Congress does not intend a statute to apply to conduct outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States [unless Congress] clearly
expresses its intent to do so.”401 Thus, just as in Interstate Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, when analyzing the constitutional validity of a
statute under the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Court should consider
congressional intent.402 While congressional intent alone would not
dictate proper use of the foreign commerce power,403 if Congress
includes an express “jurisdictional element”404 that establishes “its
connection” 405 to foreign commerce, then the courts should consider
this intent. Interestingly, only about half of the laws with extraterritorial
reach have this jurisdictional hook.406 If Congress is using its foreign
commerce power, it would be helpful if it made its intent clear.
Finally, the second presumption in statutory interpretation cases is
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains.”407 Thus, while
Congress’s power to enact statutes is not bound by international law,408
401. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86; see also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). The
requirement that the statute express its extraterritorial jurisdiction does not necessarily require a
“clear statement” that the “law applies abroad;” rather, in searching for the statutory meaning
the “context can be consulted as well.” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2883 (2010). If the statute is criminal, and congressional intent is silent as to its extraterritorial
application, then it is “inferred from the nature of the offense.” United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (explaining that the presumption against extraterritorial application does not
apply to those “criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality
for the Government’s jurisdiction”); see also, e.g., Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86 (relying on Bowman
to find that a statute prohibiting attempts to damage or destroy aircraft was intended by
Congress to apply extraterritorially); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304–06 (11th
Cir. 2000) (relying on Bowman to find that the attempt provision statute which criminalized the
smuggling of goods into the United States applied extraterritorially).
402. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the Court factors in congressional intent when
considering Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce Clause).
403. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (finding a federal
statute unconstitional under the Interstate Commerce Clause even though Congress stated its
intent was to use its interstate commerce power).
404. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995); see also supra Part II.A.4.
(discussing the Court’s consideration of congressional intent in Interstate Commerce Clause
cases).
405. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 44 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining the
Lopez decision).
406. See infra Appendix A (identifying statutes with extraterritorial application which have
an express jurisdictional hook to the foreign commerce power).
407. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
408. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “Congress is
not bound by international law” and may, if it chooses, legislate with extraterritorial application
“in excess of the limits posed by international law”) (quoting United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/3

68

Goodno: When the Commerce Clause Goes International: A Proposed Legal Fra

2013]

WHEN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE GOES INTERNATIONAL

1207

the Court assumes Congress did not intend to violate any international
legal norms. Extending this presumption to the Foreign Commerce
Clause, laws with extraterritorial application should, as discussed above,
be respectful of international norms such as foreign sovereignty. This
means that Congress presumptively would not pass laws that regulate
the conduct of non-U.S. citizens in foreign countries.409 On the other
hand, it also means that under the international legal theory of
nationality jurisdiction, Congress could regulate the conduct of U.S.
citizens in foreign countries.410
This proposed legal framework, which embodies a “means” and
“connection” factor test, attempts to take into consideration the history,
jurisprudence, and text of the Foreign Commerce Clause. This
framework reflects Congress’s broad foreign commerce power limited
by an understanding of the unique relationship the United States shares
with foreign nations. Those limits would allow Congress “to regulate
commerce” under the Foreign Commerce Clause that has both some
effect on the United States and a territorial nexus to the United States.
Congressional intent would also be considered. Finally, it would be
presumed that Congress would use its foreign commerce power to enact
laws respectful of international legal norms (such as recognition of
foreign sovereignty and of the nationality jurisdictional principle).
These factors would be considered as a whole to determine if Congress
is acting within its power under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
D. Example Applications
Because this proposed legal framework for the Foreign Commerce
Clause is a factors test, whether or not a law would be constitutionally
valid under it is a fact-specific inquiry. To give some context to the
legal framework, however, it will be applied to the four categories of
hypotheticals set forth at the beginning of this Article.411
Hypothetical Category #1: Statutes regulating conduct in the United
States. First, under the proposed legal framework, would a law creating
a U.S. embargo of Cuban cigars survive under the Foreign Commerce
Clause? This law would squarely pass constitutional muster under this
legal framework. Even under the strictest definition of “to regulate
commerce,” trade would be covered.412 Historically, Congress’s broad
foreign commerce power was meant to allow the United States to speak
F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 728 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
409. See supra Part III.B (discussing foreign sovereignty concerns).
410. See supra Part I.A (discussing the nationality principle).
411. See supra Introduction (setting forth a chart of four categories of hypotheticals).
412. See supra notes 367–71 and accompanying text (discussing the scholarly debate on
the meaning of “commerce”). The narrowest definition of “commerce” is defined as trade,
which likely encompasses embargos. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 366, at 104, 112.
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with one voice with foreign nations.413 A federal embargo fully
embraces this notion. Textually, this embargo also reflects a clear
connection to the United States in that it deals with trade that affects the
United States. There is also a territorial nexus since it regulates foreign
commerce that takes place inside the United States. Finally, enacting an
embargo is not a violation of any international norm. Thus, under the
proposed “connection” factor test, Congress would clearly have the
power to enact such an embargo.
Hypothetical Category #2: Extraterritorial statutes regulating
conduct of foreign nations. If the first hypothetical was slightly
tweaked, and the law required Mexico to enact an embargo on Cuban
cigars, problems would arise. Although such a law arguably still allows
the United States to speak with one voice in foreign matters, the law
would have much less of a connection to the United States. It is
questionable whether such a law would regulate any conduct that affects
the United States and there is no territorial nexus to the United States
(since the embargo involves Cuba and Mexico). Furthermore, absent
Mexico’s consent, such a law would encroach on Mexico’s sovereignty
and, thus, would not be respectful of international norms. Since such a
law fails to meet many of the factors, it would be an invalid exercise of
the foreign commerce power.
Hypothetical Category #3: Extraterritorial statutes regulating
conduct of U.S. citizens in foreign nations. The next set of hypotheticals
is less clear because it involves the regulation of conduct of U.S.
citizens who travel abroad. Under the proposed legal framework for the
Foreign Commerce Clause, would the PROTECT Act, a law that
criminalizes the conduct of U.S. citizens who travel abroad to molest
children,414 survive? A proper analysis requires an understanding of the
legislative history of the law and also a careful breakdown of the statute.
Legislative history shows that Congress enacted the PROTECT Act to
combat “child sex tourism” in foreign countries.415 Because of the ease
of global buying and selling on the Internet, some authorities estimate
that human trafficking is almost as lucrative as drug trafficking.416 A
fundamental reason that Congress enacted the PROTECT Act was to
eliminate the profitability of child sex trafficking. In essence, the
problem is supply and demand. For the most part, citizens of developed
413. See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of the Foreign Commerce Clause and the
“one voice” test).
414. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006).
415. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 108–66, at 51 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
416. See What Is The Role Of Transnational Organised Crime Groups In Human
Trafficking?,
UNITED
NATIONS
OFFICE
ON
DRUGS
AND
CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/faqs.html#what_is_the_role_of_transnation
al_organised_crime_groups_in_human_trafficking (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
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western countries, such as the United States and those in Europe, have
the resources to fund the demand.417 On the other hand, developing
countries, like Cambodia, often supply the children. The reason
developing countries are able to “meet the demand” is because they lack
resources and they have unstable rule of law that leaves many children
at risk of becoming victims of child sex trafficking.418 Congress enacted
the PROTECT Act in an attempt to shift the cost of prosecution from a
supply country like Cambodia to a demand country like the United
States.419
Given this legislative purpose, the PROTECT Act criminalizes both
commercial and noncommercial sex acts with children.420 Thus, the first
constitutional hurdle is whether the law regulates “commerce.” Because
a commercial sex act is economic in nature, it would likely be
considered “commerce” under the definitions of commerce that
encompass economic activity.421 The part of the statute that covers
noncommercial sex acts poses more of a problem. Since such conduct is
noneconomic in nature, then it would probably only be considered
“commerce” under the broadest definition, which defines commerce as
“intercourse.”422
417. Which Countries Are Affected By Human Trafficking?, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/faqs.html#Which_
countries_are_affected_by_human_trafficking (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
418. Id.
419. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2006) (stating that “[a] person who knowingly transports an
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for
life”).
420. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f) (defining the term “illicit sexual conduct” as “(1) a sexual act (as
defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of
chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States; or (2) any commercial sex act (as defined in section 1591) with a person under 18
years of age.”); see also supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text (discussing the PROTECT
Act).
421. See AMAR, supra note 52, at 107–08; Pushaw, Obamacare, supra note 52, at 1703; see
also supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the scholarly debate on the meaning of “commerce”).
422. AMAR, supra note 50, at 107–08. Perhaps it could be argued that even under a
narrower definition of commerce, a noncommercial sex act on a child is economic in nature.
Legislative history shows that the PROTECT Act was enacted to combat the supply-anddemand phenomenon of child sex trafficking. See supra notes 243 & 416 and accompany text
(discussing the legislative history of the PROTECT Act). Noncommercial sex acts on children
impact this supply-and-demand phenomenon as much as commercial sex acts do. A noncommercial sex act on a child signals that there is a demand for such things, which in turn might
create more supply of commercial sex acts. Arguably then, even a noncommercial sex act with a
child is economic in nature since it impacts this supply-and-demand economic theory. Another
approach to this issue might be a Raich type of analysis. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005). In Raich, the Court upheld the federal regulation of drugs (even though it encompassed
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Assuming the PROTECT Act regulates commerce, the next hurdle is
whether the conduct is “with foreign Nations.” As discussed above, the
part of the statute that makes it a crime for a U.S. citizen to enter foreign
commerce with the intent to molest a child abroad423 is covered under
the notion that Congress can regulate the improper use of the “means”
of foreign commerce.424 The harder analysis is presented by the part of
the PROTECT Act which simply criminalizes entering into foreign
commerce and later molesting a child.425 This is where the factors test
becomes fact specific. Engaging in child molestation abroad arguably
affects the United States given that the legislative history sets forth a
supply-and-demand justification for the law.426 The statute also has a
jurisdictional hook to foreign commerce.427 Moreover, the law does not
violate any international norms since the nationality principle allows for
extraterritorial application of laws without encroaching on another
country’s sovereignty.428 Given the specific facts of any particular case,
however, there might be an issue of whether there is a territorial nexus.
It would be harder to establish a territorial nexus if a U.S. citizen lived
abroad for years without recent travel to or from the United States.429
Thus, while some factors are present, each scenario would have to be
considered on a case-by-case basis to determine if Congress is acting

intra-state activity) under the Interstate Commerce Clause because the law as a whole was part
of a “general regulatory” scheme which was allowed under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id.
at 17; see also supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text (discussing Raich). Likewise, if
Congress is allowed to regulate commercial sex acts with a child, then it may be necessary and
proper for Congress to regulate noncommercial sex acts with a child (even if it is not economic
in nature) as part of a “general regulatory” scheme.
423. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (stating that “[a] person who travels in interstate commerce or
travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent
residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in
any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both.”).
425. See supra Part III.C.2.b (discussing the “means” of foreign commerce).
425. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (stating that “[a]ny United States citizen or alien admitted for
permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct
with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or
both.”); see also supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text (discussing the PROTECT Act).
426. See supra notes 243 & 416 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history
of the PROTECT Act).
427. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), (b), (c) (explaining that the prohibited conduct has to occur in
“foreign commerce”).
428. See supra Part I.A (discussing the nationality principle of jurisdiction under
international law).
429. See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, a conviction under the PROTECT Act invalid for acts
committed by a U.S. citizen who traveled between two foreign countries).
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within its power under the Foreign Commerce Clause.430
Indeed, any federal law regulating the conduct of U.S. citizens
abroad would have to undergo a similar factor analysis. Thus, for those
hypotheticals where U.S. citizens rob banks or litter in other countries,
even if such conduct constitutes “commerce” (which would vary
depending on which definition is applied), the lingering issue would be
whether their conduct abroad was somehow “connected” to the United
States. As listed in Appendix A, a majority of the laws with
extraterritorial application regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens abroad.
The proposed legal framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause set
forth in this Article could be comprehensively applied to each of these
laws on a case-by-case basis to determine whether such laws are a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s foreign commerce power.431
Hypothetical Category #4: Extraterritorial statutes regulating
conduct of non-U.S. citizens in foreign nations. Finally, if Congress
attempted to pass a law like the PROTECT Act governing the conduct
of a non-U.S. citizen in another country, the law would be invalid under
the Foreign Commerce Clause. The conduct of a non-U.S. citizen
abroad has no effect on the United States; it has no territorial nexus to
the United States; and such regulation would violate international norms
since it would encroach on the other country’s sovereignty.432 Thus,
such a law would not be constitutional under the Foreign Commerce
Clause.

430. Some scholars have argued that the PROTECT Act would be unconstitutional under
the Foreign Commerce Clause, but constitutional under the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause. See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Holds That Congress Can Regulate Sex Crimes
Committed by U.S. Citizens Abroad—United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), 119
HARV. L. REV. 2612, 2618–19 (2006) (arguing that the PROTECT Act is constitutional under
the Necessary and Proper Clause where the United States and another nation are both signatories
of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography). Limiting the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act,
and similar laws, in this way leads to inconsistent results. For example, under this analysis, a
U.S. citizen who molests a child in Cambodia would be prosecuted because Cambodia signed
the relevant treaty, but the same conduct would not be illegal in Russia, because Russia has not
ratified the relevant portion of the treaty. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status, available
at
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&chapter
=4&lang=en (showing that Russia has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child).
431. There may be other constitutional provisions that give Congress the power to enact the
laws listed in Appendix A. See supra Part I.B. (listing other constitutional provisions that may
allow Congress to enact laws with extraterritorial application). Such analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article.
432. See supra Parts I.B and III.C.
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By way of quick summary, the table below sets forth the possible
outcomes of the hypothetical laws identified in the Introduction:
Conduct by a Nation
U.S.
Actor

(1) Statutes regulating conduct
in the United States
Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can Congress
enact an embargo of Cuban
cigars?
Answer: Yes, assuming the
conduct is commerce, because it
regulates conduct that has a
connection between the United
States and the foreign nation.

Conduct by an Individual
in a Foreign Nation
(3) Extraterritorial statutes
regulating conduct of U.S. citizens
in foreign nations
Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can Congress
enact a law that subjects U.S.
citizens to criminal prosecution if
they molest children in Cambodia?
•Or if they rob a bank in Spain?
•Or if they litter in France?
Answer: It depends.433 Even
assuming the conduct is commerce,
each law would have to be taken on
a case-by-case basis to determine if
there was a “connection” between
the United States and the foreign
nation.434

NonU.S.
Actor

(2) Extraterritorial statutes
regulating conduct of foreign
nations

(4) Extraterritorial statutes
regulating conduct of non-U.S.
citizens in foreign nations

Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can Congress
pass a law requiring Mexico to
enact an embargo of Cuban
cigars?

Hypo: Under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, can Congress
pass a law prohibiting a
Cambodian citizen from molesting a
child in Cambodia?

Answer: No, even if the conduct
is commerce, because there is no
impact on the United States,
there is no territorial nexus, and
such a law would violate the
notion of foreign sovereignty,
there would be no connection
between the United States and the
foreign nation.

Answer: No—same answer as
Category #2.

433. Category three encompasses many of current federal laws with extraterritorial
application. See infra Appendix A to this Article.
434. See supra Part III.C. (discussing the factors to consider when determining if a federal
law has a “connection” to foreign commerce).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has set forth a comprehensive legal framework for the
Foreign Commerce Clause that considers the history, jurisprudence, and
text of the constitutional provision. Given that there are already
hundreds of laws with extraterritorial application435 and that society is
becoming increasingly global, Congress’s foreign commerce power
may become as prominent an issue as Congress’s interstate commerce
power. Simply superimposing the legal framework of the Interstate
Commerce Clause (or the Indian Commerce Clause) onto the Foreign
Commerce Clause fails to fully consider the unique history and text of
the Foreign Commerce Clause and the unique relationship between the
United States and foreign nations. Nevertheless, that is what a majority
of lower courts have done.436 On the other hand, those lower courts that
have adopted a distinct Foreign Commerce Clause test have used
language that is seemingly limitless.437 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet
to articulate a test. The framework proposed here sets forth factors that
allow for broad foreign commerce power but with some practical limits.
Such limits are important, particularly when federal laws regulate the
conduct of U.S. citizens abroad.

435. See infra Appendix A.
436. See supra Part II.B.
437. See id.
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APPENDIX A
CHART OF U.S. LAWS WITH POSSIBLE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION
(1) Homicide, Kidnapping, Assault, Sex Crimes, Threats, and
Terrorism
Homicide
CODE

CONDUCT REGULATED

Does the statute explicitly state
Congress is regulating foreign
commerce or applying the statute
extraterritorially?438

18 U.S.C. § 351

Congressional, Cabinet, and
Supreme Court assassination,
kidnapping, and assault

Yes—Extraterritorial reach

18 U.S.C. § 1119

U.S. citizen murdering another
U.S. citizen in a foreign
country

Yes—Extraterritorial reach

18 U.S.C. §§ 32, 33,
37, 38, 43,
115(a)(1)(A-B),
175, 229, 794,
844(d,f,i), 930, 956,
1091, 1116, 1117,
1120, 1121(a),
1365, 1503, 1652,
1751, 1952, 1958,
1992, 2118, 2283,
2441

Conduct involving homicide of
victims such as federal
employees, officials, federal
witnesses, or internationally
protected persons, and deaths
resulting from mass or lethal
weapons offenses

18 U.S.C. §§ 112,
115(a)(1)(A-B),
175, 831,439 871,440
875, 877-879, 1503,
1505, 1512,441 1513

Conduct involving threats to
destroy federal property or
threats to murder, assault, or
kidnap certain victims,
including government officials
and internationally protected
persons

§ 32—Foreign air commerce
§ 33—Foreign commerce
§ 38—Foreign commerce
§ 43—Foreign commerce
§ 175—Extraterritorial reach
and foreign commerce
§ 844—Foreign commerce
§ 1365—Foreign commerce
§ 1751—Extraterritorial reach
§ 1952—Foreign commerce
§ 1958—Foreign commerce
§ 2118—Foreign commerce
§ 175—Extraterritorial reach
§ 875—Foreign commerce
§ 1512—Extraterritorial reach
§ 1513—Extraterritorial reach

438. See supra Part III.C (discussing that one factor to consider in a Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis is an explicit jurisdictional element expressing congressional intent to use
foreign commerce power).
439. Proposed legislation.
440. Proposed legislation.
441. Proposed legislation.
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Kidnapping

CODE

CONDUCT REGULATED

18 U.S.C.
§§ 115(a)(1)(AB), 351, 956,
1201, 1203,
1204

Conduct involving hostage
taking, conspiracy to kidnap,
or actual kidnapping of certain
victims, including federal
officials and children
Parental kidnapping by
keeping a child outside of the
U.S.
Congressional, Cabinet, and
Supreme Court assassination,
kidnapping, and assault
Kidnapping

18 U.S.C.
§ 1204
18 U.S.C. § 351
18 U.S.C.
§ 1201
18 U.S.C.
§§ 112,
115(a)(1)(A-B),
175, 831,442
871,443 875,
877-879, 1503,
1505, 1512,444
1513

Conduct involving threats to
destroy federal property or
threats to murder, assault, or
kidnap certain victims,
including government officials
and internationally protected
persons

Does the statute explicitly
state Congress is regulating
foreign commerce or applying
the statute extraterritorially?
§ 351—Extraterritorial reach
§ 1201—Foreign commerce

Yes—Extraterritorial reach

Yes—Extraterritorial reach

Yes—Foreign commerce
§ 175—Extraterritorial reach
§ 875—Foreign commerce
§ 1512—Extraterritorial reach
§ 1513—Extraterritorial reach

442. Proposed legislation.
443. Proposed legislation.
444. Proposed legislation.
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Assault
CODE

7 U.S.C. §§ 60, 87b,
473c-1, 511i, 2146

CONDUCT REGULATED

Does the statute explicitly state
Congress is regulating foreign
commerce or applying the
statute extraterritorially?

Assault or homicide of various
federal farming programs

§ 87b—Foreign commerce
No

16 U.S.C. §§ 1436,
1857, 1859

Assault or death of a federal
officer under the Horse Protection
Act
Assaults on federal officials
associated with marine
conservation programs

18 U.S.C. § 175c

Purposeful transmission of small
pox (Variola virus)

Yes—Regulation in or
affecting foreign commerce

Congressional, Cabinet, and
Supreme Court assassination,
kidnapping, and assault

Yes—Extraterritorial reach

18 U.S.C. § 351

Conduct involving assaults on
victims such as federal
employees, officials, federal
witnesses, or internationally
protected persons

§ 1751—Extraterritorial reach
§ 2262—Foreign commerce

§ 175—Extraterritorial reach
§ 875—Foreign commerce
§ 1512—Extraterritorial reach
§ 1513—Extraterritorial reach

18 U.S.C. § 2332

Conduct involving threats to
destroy federal property or threats
to murder, assault, or kidnap
certain victims, including
government officials and
internationally protected persons
Assaulting Americans overseas

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e13, 2283

Assaulting or causing the death of
federal officials, namely EEOC
personnel and nuclear inspectors

No

49 U.S.C.
§§ 46502,450 46504,
46506

Assaulting or causing the death of
someone in an act involving
aircraft such as piracy

No

15 U.S.C.
§ 1825(a)(2)(C)

18 U.S.C. §§ 37,
111, 112, 1091,445
1365, 1501-1503,
1512, 1513, 1655,
1751, 2114, 2194,
2261, 2262, 2332
18 U.S.C. §§ 112,
115(a)(1)(A-B),
175, 831,446 871,447
875, 877-879, 1503,
1505, 1512,448 1513

§ 1857—Foreign commerce

Yes449

445. Proposed legislation.
446. Proposed legislation.
447. Proposed legislation.
448. Proposed legislation.
449. See, e.g., United States v. Alwan, 822 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676–77 (W.D. Ky. 2011)
(interpreting the statute to have extraterritorial application to foreign countries under United
States military occupation where there were conspiracies to commit murder of United States
nationals in Iraq or to use weapons of mass destruction to murder United States nationals).
450. Proposed legislation.
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Sex Crimes
CODE

CONDUCT REGULATED

18 U.S.C.
§ 3271

Overseas human trafficking by
those employed by U.S.
American traveling overseas
with intent to commit illegal sex
act
Manufacture, distribution, or
possession of illegal drugs with
intent to import to U.S.
Child pornography with intent to
import into the U.S.

18 U.S.C.
§ 2423
21 U.S.C.
§ 959
18 U.S.C.
§ 2260

Does the statute explicitly state
Congress is regulating foreign
commerce or applying the
statute extraterritorially?
No
Yes

No

No

Threats

CODE

18 U.S.C. §
877
18 U.S.C.
§§ 112,
115(a)(1)(AB), 175,
831,451 871,452
875, 877-879,
1503, 1505,
1512,453 1513
49 U.S.C.
§ 46507

CONDUCT REGULATED

Does the statute explicitly
state Congress is regulating
foreign commerce or
applying the statute
extraterritorially?

Mailing threatening
communications from foreign
country
Conduct involving threats to
destroy federal property or
threats to murder, assault, or
kidnap certain victims,
including government officials
and internationally protected
persons

Yes – Improper use of the
channels of foreign mail
system
§ 175—Extraterritorial reach
§ 875—Foreign commerce
§ 1512—Extraterritorial reach
§ 1513—Extraterritorial reach

Threatening to attack an aircraft

No

451. Proposed legislation.
452. Proposed legislation.
453. Proposed legislation.
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Terrorism
CODE
21 U.S.C.
§ 960A
18 U.S.C.
§ 2339D
18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B
18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b
18 U.S.C.
§ 831

CONDUCT REGULATED
Narco-terrorism
Receipt of military training from
a foreign terrorist organization
Providing resources to
designated terrorist organizations
Terrorist acts transcending
national boundaries
Actual or attempted possession,
or conspiring to possess nuclear
material

Does the statute explicitly state
Congress is regulating foreign
commerce or applying the
statute extraterritorially?
No
Yes—Extraterritorial reach
Yes—Extraterritorial reach
Yes—Extraterritorial reach
No

(2) Property Destruction
CODE

CONDUCT REGULATED

18 U.S.C.
§§ 32, 33, 37,
43,
115(a)(1)(AB), 229, 331,
844(f,i), 956,
1030, 1361,
1362, 2071,
2153, 2155,
2332(a)
18 U.S.C.
§§ 112,
115(a)(1)(AB), 175,
831,454 871,455
875, 877-879,
1503, 1505,
1512,456 1513

Conduct involving destruction
of property, including aircraft,
motor vehicles, international
airports, and other federal
property

Conduct involving threats to
destroy federal property or
threats to murder, assault, or
kidnap certain victims,
including government officials
and internationally protected
persons

Does the statute explicitly
state Congress is regulating
foreign commerce or applying
the statute extraterritorially?
§ 32—Foreign air commerce
§ 33—Foreign commerce
§ 43—Foreign commerce
§ 844(i) —Foreign commerce
§ 1030—Foreign commerce

§ 175—Extraterritorial reach
§ 875—Foreign commerce
§ 1512—Extraterritorial reach
§ 1513—Extraterritorial reach

454. Proposed legislation.
455. Proposed legislation.
456. Proposed legislation.
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(3) False Statements, Theft, Counterfeiting, and Fraud
False Statements
CONDUCT
REGULATED

CODE

7 U.S.C.
§ 2024(b)
8 U.S.C.
§ 1160(b)(7)(A)
15 U.S.C.
§§ 158, 645,
714m
18 U.S.C.
§§ 152, 287, 289,
541, 542, 550,
1001-1003,
1007, 1011,
1014, 1015,
1019, 1020,
1027, 1542,
1546, 1621, 1622

Fraudulently claiming
food stamps
Willfully falsifying
information on an
application for
immigration status
False statements regarding
federal administrations
Conduct involving false
statements in situations
such as banking,
immigration services, and
claims against the United
States
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Theft, Counterfeiting, and Money Crimes
Does the statute explicitly state
Congress is regulating foreign
commerce or applying the
statute extraterritorially?

CODE

CONDUCT REGULATED

18 U.S.C.
§§ 371, 641,
645, 648, 65658, 831, 793798, 1010,
1013, 1026,
1031, 1506,
1707, 1711,
2071, 2112,
2115

Conduct involving theft,
fraud, and embezzlement of
property such as food
stamps, federally insured
credit unions and banks, and
social security

No

Falsifying documents with
intent to defraud a
corporation under TVA
Conduct involving the
counterfeiting of United
States’ federal property, such
as coins, records, and stamps

No

Money laundering

No

Illegal money transactions

No

16 U.S.C.
§ 831t
18 U.S.C.
§§ 470-474,
484, 486, 487,
490, 491, 493501, 503, 505510, 513, 514
18 U.S.C.
§ 1956
18 U.S.C.
§ 1957
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Fraud

CODE

18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(10)
45 U.S.C.
§ 359

CONDUCT REGULATED

Fraud in connection with
access devices (e.g. cloning
cell phone numbers)
Fraudulently collecting
railroad unemployment
insurance

Does the statute explicitly
state Congress is regulating
foreign commerce or
applying the statute
extraterritorially?
Yes—foreign commerce
No

(4) Other Laws with Extraterritorial Reach
Trade and Commerce
CONDUCT
REGULATED

CODE
Title 15 of
the United
State Code Commerce
and Trade

Conduct involving
Commerce and Trade

Does the statute explicitly
state Congress is regulating
foreign commerce or
applying the statute
extraterritorially?
15 U.S.C. § 1127 defines the
term “‘commerce,’ as used
throughout the entire chapter,
to mean all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by
Congress.”457

457. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added).
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CODE

18 U.S.C.
§ 1512
18 U.S.C.
§ 1513
18 U.S.C.
§§ 1831–1839
18 U.S.C.
§ 1992
18 U.S.C.
§§ 2151–2157
18 U.S.C.
§ 2381
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CONDUCT
REGULATED

Does the statute explicitly
state Congress is regulating
foreign commerce or
applying the statute
extraterritorially?

Tampering with federal
witness or informant
Retaliating against a
federal witness or
informant
Economic espionage,
stealing trade secrets
Attacks on transit systems
involved in commerce
Sabotage

Yes—Extraterritorial reach

No

Treason

No

No
No
No
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